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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
The problem of the thesis will be to examine the concept 
of deity as it is developed in Plato's philosophy. There will 
be no attempt to demonstrate a unity of Plato's thought; how-
ever, it is felt that Plato's final statement or his religion 
and theology in Book Ten of the Laws represents both a recon-
struction of his earlier thought and a final synthesis of his 
interpretation of Greek religion. Therefore the thesis will 
move towards an understanding of Book Ten of the Laws insofar 
as that book informs the entire development of Plato's con-
ception or God. 
2. Definitions 
Plato does not hold to a definite, clear-cut definition 
of God throughout his dialogues. He is much indebted to the 
religion of the Pre-Socratics, tragedians, and the mystery 
cults, and he initially endorses the various gods of this 
early Greek religion. But it was his reaction to the religion 
of this early polytheism that stirred Plato to formulate his 
own concept of God. Therefore it must be borne in mind that 
the idea of God in Plato's thought changes as he first dis-
cards his antecedent religious background in the early 
1 
dialogues and develops his highly monistic concept of 
diety in the Timaeus and the ~· 
3. Limitations 
2 
The thesis will deal only with the antecedent religious 
background rrom which Plato was to ror.mulate his conception 
of God; the doctrine of Ideas as it was brought to bear on 
his philosophy of the soul; Plato's treatment of the exis-
tence and immortality of the soul, which is his basis for 
positing a God; and the religious cosmology of the Timaeus 
and~ in which is seen Plato's perfected conception of 
God. The thesis is further limited to those aspects of 
Plato's t hought that shaw definite transition from one 
level of development to another. Only those dialogues 
which fully represent a particular stage in Plato's develop-
ment will be referred to. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
One of the earlier works on Plato's concept of God is 
Taylor Lewis' Plato Against the Athaists.1 This volume 
treats Book Ten of the ~as a culmination of Plato's 
religious thinking. P. E. More's ~Religion of Plato,2 
lTaylor Lewis, Plato A'ainst ~ Atheists (New 
Harper and Brothers, 1845 • 
2p. E. More, The Reli~ion of Plato (Princeton: 
ton University Press, l9 8). 
York: 
Prince-
and Friedrich Solmsen's Plato's Theolosz1 both develop the 
religion of Plato as it arises in the course of his phi-
losophy. More's approach is similar to Lewis' in that they 
both lend a sympathetic Christian ear to Plato's theology. 
H. R. Lewis, of the Boston University School of Theology, 
wrote his master 's thesis on Plato's God and the Idea of 
the Good, which contrasted Plato's ethical God with the Form 
of the Good. 2 
5. The Methodology of the Thesis 
It is not until the writing of the Timaeus that a definite 
conception of God emerges--one which has any relation to the 
Judaeo- Christian deity that is generally connoted by the word 
God. Thus, the thesis will be primarily concerned with the 
treatment of certain aspects of Plato 's thought that would 
render the emergence of God in the Timaeus a logical conse-
qlence of his earlier dialogues as well as give more per-
suasive significance to the theology of Book Ten of the ~· 
The Doctrine of Ideas and the philosophy of the soul will 
be treated as they were developed in themselves and as they 
were later to contribute to t he cosmology of the Timaeus and 
lFriedrich Solmsen, Plato's Theology (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1942). 
2H. R. Lewis, 11God and the Idea of the Good in the 
Thought of Plato" (Unpublished s. T. M. thesis, Boston Uni-
versity School of Theol ogy , 1926} . 
the t heology of the Laws vhioh are the products of Plato's 
mature religious thought. As an over-all background to 
Plato's philosophy, an appraisal of early Greek religion 
will be made in an attempt to determine some of the major 
influences to which Plato was indebted in his work. 
4 
The methodology of the thesis specifically will be to 
give the logical and chronological development of the Ideas 
and the soul, which is the basis for Plato's concept of God. 
Having presented the concepts of the Forms and the subsequent 
belief in the immortal soul, the thesis will move to a con-
sideration of Plato's deity--a God who is the Creator in the 
Timaeus and the loving Father in the Laws. 
CF~PTER II 
PLATO AND HIS TIME 
1. The Life of Plato 
It is believed that Plato was born in the month Thar-
gelion (May-June) about 428 B.C. and died at the age of 80 
in 348 B. c. The dates of Plato's life are only approx~ate 
as they are determined in relation to other equally doubtful 
historical events. Plato was the son of Ariston and Perictione, 
and was first named Aristocles after his grandfather . Later 
he received the nickname of Plato from the broadness of his 
shoulders and chest. Being of aristocratic and wealthy Athe-
nian parentage and having enjoyed all the educationa l and 
social benefits of such an influential and well-to-do family, 
Plato was exposed to the Periclean world at its zenith. The 
art, drama, education, and politics of t his period made an 
indelible imprint upon young Plato's character. 
At the age of about 16 Plato attached himself to Socrates, 
and formed a close association with his master that was to 
last twelve years. About all that can be said definitely is 
that up until ~e age of 26 the i nfluence of Socrates' friend-
ship must have been the most potent force in the young phi-
5 
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losopher's li~e.1 It was not until the death of Socrates 
that Plato decided to forsake a career as a social and 
legislative reformer and become a thinker or man of science. 
Following the trial and death o~ Socrates, Plato, ~ear-
ing ~or his li~e at the hands of his master's executioners, 
withdrew from Athens to the neighboring city o~ Megara. where 
he lived with Euclides, a philosopher who combined both the 
tenets of Socrates and those of Parmenides. This exile was 
only to las~ as long as the bitter feelings of the cause 
celebre surrounding Socrates' death were still impassioned. 
Following his stay in Megara, Plato spent approximately the 
next ten years traveling in Italy, Cyrene, and Egypt.2 
About 390 B. c. Plato visited Magna Graecia and Sicily 
where he became acquainted with the Pythagorean and Orphic 
teachings, especially the doctrines o~ the origin and immor-
tality of the soul and the moral life. It was also in Syracuse 
that he took part in some political action with his close 
friend Archytas, the brother-in-law of the reigning tyrant, 
lvery little is known about Plato's early life and associ-
ation with Socrates. The little that can be directly conjec-
tured is found in Plato's early dialogues; c~. Apology and Phaedo. 
2The facts concerning Plato's li~e from the death o~ 
Socrates until the founding of the Academy are at best only 
well-~ounded suppositions. Such leading authorities on Plato 
as Eduard Zeller, Outlines £f. ~ History of Greek Philosophy, 
trans. Leonard Palmer (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931); 
A. E. Taylor, Plato, The ~ !!!£ His ~ {London: The Macmillan 
Co., 1949}; and Paul Shorey, ~hat Plato ~ {Chicago: The Uni-
versity o~ Chicago Press, l93~differ as to the exact course 
of Plato's life during this period. 
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lionysius. This action ended disasterously, and Plato was 
interned as a political prisoner by Dionysius and sent to 
Aegina to be sold as a slave. "Luckily !'or Plato and Western 
Civilization, a friend of Plato recognized him, bought him, 
set him free, and sent him back to Athens. 111 Plato then 
spent ten years writing philosophical works which represented 
more the views of Socrates than his own. 
At the age of forty Plato established the Academy, and 
spent the remainder of his life, with the exception of three 
violent trips back to Syracuse, organizing his Academy, teach-
ing and writing. It was during these years that he wrote the 
dialogues o!' his middle and later period. 
In the year 367, Plato, now a man of sixty, was invited 
by Dion, the brother-in-law of Dionysius II, the feeble ruler 
of Syracuse, to come to Sicily and educate Dionysius II to 
the philosophy and science of the Academy. One failure 
followed another. After his third attempt proved fruitless, 
Plato withdrew from active politics and concerned himself 
solely with the affairs of the Academy. Plato's later life 
was uneventful save for two highly significant occurrences. 
In 367 B. c. Aristotle arrived at the Academy. In 360 B. C. 
lThis account of Plato's trip to Italy is taken from 
Peter A. Bertocci's "Syllabus for the History of Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy" (Boston University Graduate School, 1958), 
p. 10. 
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Plato wrote the ~, the crowning achievement or his phi-
losophic life. Plato finished out his days at the Academy, 
meditating and lecturing to his associates. 
As it is recorded in the Timaeus, Republic, and Par-
menides, Plato was expertly schooled in the aristocratic 
Periclean political regime. He was born and grew up in an 
aristocratic atmosphere, so Plato was imbued with a natural 
bias against democracy. Coupled with this childhood back-
ground, the events of Socrates' death put the finishing 
touches on his distrust of any form of democracy. But un-
like Socrates, Plato employed the technical competence of 
political l eadership and moral education of the people against 
the enemy of independent thought and action. As seen by his 
experiment in political and moral aristocracy in Syracuse, 
Plato was not content merely to theorize about the good life, 
he also practiced it--early in the arena of the minds of 
common men, later among the more developed minds of his dis-
ciples. No small wonder it was that upon his death the le-
gend sprang up that saw in him a son of Apollo, guardian of 
the Good. 
2. The Works of Plato 
i. Periods of His Work 
There still seems to be some question as to the exact 
order of the Platonic Dialogues. Numerous sources have been 
consulted, and a synthesis has been developed to make as 
much coherence as possible from available data and to make 
meaningful the methodology of the thesis.l 
9 
As will be seen from the chart which follows, the first 
period of Plato's work can be termed~ Minor Socratic Period. 
The division of Plato ' s dialogues represents Plato's endeavor 
to carry on his master ' s philosophical method of inquiry. On 
the Whole these dialogues are short, simpl~ statements con-
cerning most of the problems in which Socrates was interested. 
By and large no final view of metaphysics is stated, and only 
the nature of definition and knowledge is examined. It would 
appear that Plato is concerned primarily with asking the im-
portant q.1 estions and less concerned with any clear-cut ans-
wers to these questions. 
The Later Socratic Dialogues were composed in the second 
period of Plato ' s writing. The figure of Socrates dominates 
this section, and the events of his trial and death form the 
historical background for the Socratic philosophy. 11 In the 
dialogues of this period Plato still shows himself under the 
ban of Socratic intellectual determinism, 112 as he strives to 
lThe following sources have been consulted in the deter-
mination of the periods of Plato's writings: P . A. Bertocci, 
Ibid.; John Burnet, Platonism (Berkeley, Calif. : University of 
~fornia Press, 1928); Plato, Works of Plato, trans. Benjamin 
Jowett (New York : Tudor Press, 1937); w. Lutoslawski, Origin 
and Growth of Plato's Logic (New York: The Macmillan Co., l897); 
x:-E. Taylor; op. cit.; and Eduard Zeller, op. cit. 
2zeller, op. cit. , p. 139. 
articulate Socrates' ethics and morality. 
The third period, or the Middle Period, suggests a 
decided break with the earlier two parts of the Platonic 
10 
writings. The importance of Socrates as a dramatis per-
sonae is now secondary to the subjects of the dial ogues 
themselves . "Plato in his early dialogues was working out 
his master ' s thought; ••• he gradually saw that Socrates, 
especially in his theory of concepts, didn't go far enough, 
and developed h i s metaphysical theory of ideas. 111 Thus the 
development of the doctrine of Ideas is of primary importance 
in these dialogues. Plato is trying to answer two questions 
in this "critical" period: What is man ' s relation to the 
world, and, What is the nature of man 1 This period of his 
writing took place after the encounter with the Orphics and 
Pythagoreans o:f Italy. The Pythagorean theory of the soul 
is developed fully in the Phaedo, after it had been explored 
earlier in the Gorgias and the ~· The great works of the 
Republi c, Symposium, and the Phaedrus were written in this 
period and the doctrine of Ideas was given its initial state-
ment . At the end of this period Pl ato began to raise objec-
tions to some of his earlier concepts, and it is these objec-
tions that mark the beginning of his final period. 
The final section of Plato's work is called the Period 
of Reconstruction. By this time Pl ato had been some twenty 
lsertoeet, OE · cit., P• 23 . 
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years at the Academy, and his thought had undergone the 
modifications of reflective maturity. There is little or 
no mention of Socrates in these final dialogues. Plato is 
on his own, and Socrates is brought in only to illustrate 
his epistemological doctrine that knowledge is possible. 
Plato's own metaphysics is reworked in this period, and the 
final statement of his political, social, and theological 
views is made. The ~represent the conclusion of Plato's 
systematic philosophy. Combining all the elements of Greek 
religion, early Greek philosophers, and his own teacher 
Socrates, Plato brings to a f'inal synthesis his lif'e 1 s in-
vestigation of nature, man, and God. 
ii. Chronology of His Work1 
Part One: The Minor Socratic Dialogues 
1. Hippias Major 
2. Hippias Minor 
3 . Ion 
4. Menexemus 
5. Charmides 
6. Laches 
7. Lysis 
8. Cratylus 
9. Eu thydemus 
Part Two : !h! Later Socratic Dialogues 
1. Gorgias 
2. Meno 
3. Eutbyphro 
4. Apology 
5. Crito 
lwo attempt has been made to determine the validity of' 
the Epistles or other doubtful writings of Plato. This table 
follows Bertocci•s order according to periods and Taylor's 
over-all chronology. 
Part Three: The Middle Period 
1. Phaedo 
2 . · Symposium 
3 . Protagoras 
4 . Republic 
5. Phaedrus 
Part Four: The Reconstruction Period 
1. Theatetus 
2. Parmenides 
3. Sophist 
4. Politicus 
5. Philibus 
6 . Timaeus 
7 . Critias 
8. Laws 9. Epinomes (doubtful) 
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CHAPTER III 
EARLY GREEK RELIGIONl 
The early Greek religions became ingra.ined in every 
Greek in Plato's time, both shaping his t hinking and govern-
ing his way or lire. Because or the tremendous in£luence 
religion had on young philosophers and statesmen, a brier 
investigation will help shed some light on the early think-
ing of Plato himself. 
By and large , Greek religion was more a perrected human-
ism than a relationship between man and God . The objects of 
devotion ranged from a lawrul nature, to a lawful state, and 
to the will of the gods, which many times were no more than 
causal agents. Very little serious attention was paid to 
man's soul before the time of Socrates. The Greeks did not 
base their religion on the inner experience or the soul; 
rather, they felt themselves akin to nature which came to 
them from without, and there was little or no distinction 
between the natural and the moral law. However, a more 
religious orientation was soon grafted on these animistic 
and naturalistic tendencies. At the time of Homer, a reli-
gion had begun to mean the search for help and guidance from 
lThe treatment of Early Greek Religion is not intended 
to be exhaustive or in any way complete. Rather, it is a 
cursory survey of some of the more important influences on 
Plato•s philosophy of religion. 
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God and the gods for internal needs·. 1 
1. T.he Homeric Pantheon 
Plato refers again and again to the Homeric gods. 2 In 
his poetry and prose Homer set the tone for early Greek 
religion by anthropomorphizing the animistic beliefs of the 
early Ionians. Religion then became, in the era of Homer 
and Hesiod, a matter of man 1 s personal and social relation-
ships with these Olympic deities. These gods were quite un-
like the God of the early Hebrews. The gods symbolized na-
tural powers; they were human beings without mystery. They 
acted from common and ignoble motives, not seldom from envy, 
caprice, or lust.3 But behind and above these "carefree 
gods" there gradually arose a power to which the early Greek 
looked up to with the utmost seriousness. This power was 
immutable fate or Moira. In contrast to the pulsating vi-
tality of the humanized gods, this fate was a bloodless 
abstraction, the creation of which made man realize his de-
pendence on the natural laws.4 
With this wide gulf present between man and the gods, 
l sertocci, op. cit., PP• 2-3. 
2shorey, op. cit., P• a, says that "Plato quotes or 
alludes to Homer about one hundred and twenty times." 
3sheldon Cheney, Men Who ~ Walked With God (New York: 
A. A. Knopf an d Co., 1948), p. 86. 
4zeller, op. cit., p. 23. 
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it is evident that no man is a god or can become a god. This 
ins~ght i s Homer 's special contribution to Greek Religion, 
and, hi storically considered, it is one of the most important 
ever made . 1 With this important step we can begin to notice 
a gradual maturing of the Homeric theogony from his early, 
almost naive, consideration of the conception of the world 
and its di vine personages to his later treatment of the gods 
in a moral setting.2 The cult of the Olympian Gods demanded 
perfection of type, but these gods mingled in human affairs 
internally as patrons of groups and cities rather than re-
deemers from evil. 
Beneath this Homeric unsophistication lay a reflective 
wonderment about the world and life. There is a deep feeling 
for the transience of all earthly things and a need to find 
some permanence in this world of change. For the Homeric 
man "life in the light of the sun is the true life, against 
which the shadow existence in Hades is of no significance.113 
The shortness of life, the probl em of evil, and the nature 
of suffering are all themes touched upon i n Homer 's later 
poems. There is nowhere any trace of the working out of these 
lJ. A. K. Thompson, "The Religion of Homer," Encyclopedia 
of Religion ~ Ethics, X, 762. 
2G. s. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Thinkers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l957), deal with this 
very important phase of Homer's cosmology and theogony in 
their chapter on Forerunners of Philosophical Cosmogony . 
3zeller, op. cit., P• 26 . 
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ideas, but the notes are sounded--awating the answer or later 
thinkers. "Beneath the surface of the heroic poetry and its 
myths the Logo& begins to stir, soon to grow bold and raise 
its head. 111 
The groundwork was now laid. Homer and his counterpart 
Hesiod had detennined the course of Greek thinking from the 
late Eight Century B. c. down to the early Fifth Century. 
"It was Homer and Hesiod, 11 said Herodotus, "who composed a 
theogony for the Greeks, and who first gave the gods distinc-
tive titles, and derined their form and functions. 112 But some-
time in the Fifth Century Greek religion entered upon a criti-
cal stage in its development. 
The old popular cults no longer satisfied the new strong 
emotions, and the necessity for a personal relation be-
tween the individual man and his God made it sell felt. 
• • • The insecurity or property and life which the 
political revolutions brought with them could only in-
tensify the deep innate feelings for the transience of 
all earthly things and cause him to look for some super-
terrestrial support which would assure him security and 
permanence amid all the change of mortal t h ings.3 
Let us now move on to an analysis of this critical period 
for a statement of the causes and results of this upheaval 
in the religion of Homer. 
2Thomson, op. cit., P• 763. 
3zeller, op. cit., PP• 12-13. 
2. The Destruction and Reconstruction 
o£ Greek Religion 
17 
The legend of Homer 's mythology was destined to pervade 
Greek thinking as late as the time o£ Plato~ but other fac-
tors were to arise which determined the character of Greek 
Religion until the triumph of Christianity. 
i. Political In£luences 
Probably the most enduring political contribution of 
the Homeric religion was that through the Olympic gods Greece 
was given a unifying mythology and a national consciousness. 1 
These Panhellenic gods possessed a certain 1ntrins1cality and 
universality of their own, independent of religion. In the 
later Homeric poems it is noted that the histories of the 
gods were becoming increasingly bound up in the secular life 
and legends of Greece. As the Greek city-states became more 
autonomous, they adopted their own deities from the Homeric 
Pantheon and made these deities national idols. The citizens 
of the cities looked to their gods as their protectors and 
even conceived of these deities as symbols of their city. 
"In the classical Greek city, devotion and observance of 
duties to the city-protecting deity and loyalty to the city 
d th ame thing n2 To question the axis-herself are one an e s • 
tence of t he gods was, in effect~ questioning the reality of 
the city-state. At the height of t he Hellenic civilization 
lsolmsen, op. cit., P• 8 . 
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the Greek possessed his individual identity only inso~ar as 
he was a citizen of a city-state. And just as each Greek was 
first and foremost a citizen and his life, status and well-
being was bound up with his city, so it was of his gods and 
goddesses .l It was but a step to attribute the ideals o~ the 
city to its protectors. Athena and Zeus bad come to stand 
~or the idea of justice, and, in general, all the more impor-
tant gods were less arbitrary than they had been in Homer 's 
time. This transformation in large measure is the result of 
their becoming 11 citizens."2 More and more the fortunes of 
the gods were related to the fortunes of the city-states and 
their citizens. But as a result of this more refined inter-
pretati on of Homer, the gods were destined to be radically 
trans~ormed by the same crisis that was to upset the old 
relations between the individual and the state. And this 
traumatic disaster was to taka the form of the Peloponnesian 
war, 431-404 B. c., in which the status of man, state, and 
religion was put to task and finally uprooted. However, 
this upheaval was not to occur for some years. Other influ-
ences were to arise to shake the foundations of Homer's 
religion. 
llli_£., P• 4. 
2~., pp. 11-12. 
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ii. Greek Tragedians 
As long as there was no doubt that the morality of the 
gods completely corresponded to the official morality of the 
city-state, the religion of the city-states continued un-
questioned. But this situation was not to last. In the 
latter half of the Fifth Century cracks were already noticed 
in the religion of the city-state. The sophisticated G~eek 
trage dians: Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides initiated 
the destruction of the state religion by attacking the morality 
of the city-states and their citizens. New Standards were 
set up by these literary moralists. Ethical individualism 
replaced the morality of the many. But the poets and play-
writes did not end their attack with the state. As soon 
as the traditional morality was questioned in the state, the 
gods, too, came under careful scrutiny. To be sure, it was 
the gods who were attacked, never the standards they bore. 
Because the Homeric poems were so deeply ingrained in the 
minds of t he Greeks, their religion was not easily destroyed. 
But the tragedians succeeded in capturing the minds of the 
intelligentsia through their poetic efforts, and gradually 
Homer was replaced by these poets, and Homer's gods fell 
before these new conceptions of the deities. 
Aeschylus, the f ather of tragedy, is much indebted to 
Homer and Hesiod for a great part of his literary material. 
Apollo and Athene still retain most of the divine attributes 
20 
that Homer had ascribed to them, but they now represent more 
the embodiment of truth, knowledge, and wisdom. Theology 
is sought not in mythology, but in history and man's con-
science. The supreme deity is not only all-powerful but 
also all-just. Zeus in Prometheus, Agamennon, and the 
Oresteia trilogy is thought of as "Strength and Justice--
the greatest of all." Along with this personal aspect of 
the gods arose an impersonal conception of universal order. 
This is a more advanced notion of Homer's fate. Aeschylus' 
contribution, then, is found in his attempt to moralize 
traditional beliefs, embodied in myths and institutions, 
by the lisnt of certain religi ous presuppositions and moral 
convictions.l 
In the work of Sophocles the gods are still national 
heroes and living powers, but more stress is laid on the 
universal supremacy of Zeus and the oracular truth of Apollo. 
Athene also holds a conspicuous place among the gods . The 
sovereignity of Zeus spares none whose folly misleads them 
into sin or evil. Life many times appears to be a "vale of 
tearstt from which death is the only release. Divine rule 
is inexorable, and piety is never without its reward. For 
sophocles, even more than for Aeschylus, fate is identified 
with an inscrutable Divine Providence of which the oracles 
lnAeschylus," Encyclopedia of Religion ~ Ethics, 
edited by James Hastings, 1(1919}7 151-52. 
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are the exponents. The reli gious thought of the poet is 
seen throughout his works. This is illustrated by such 
themes as an eternal law of integrity in thought and action 
(Oedipus~); the punishment of disobeying God's commandments 
(Oedipus Coloneus); the hope of grace (Oedipus Col oneus; and 
the misery of human life (Trachinioe). Sophocles, having 
experienced much of the realities of life, did express the 
hope that sh ines through the sadness of life. 
The loyal heart of Antigone, the love of Deinaira, the 
bortherhood of Teucer, the essential purity and public 
spirit of Oedipus, the faithful endurance of Electra, 
the incorrupt! ble truth of Neoptolemus-- these belong to 
the eternal things, however, on this narrow isthmus of 
morali~, they may be frustrated or obscured.l 
Euripides, the last of the three great tragedians, is 
especiall y important to Greek religion because his emphasis 
on the immortality of the traditional gods (~, ~~ Danae); 
the problem of the unjust gpvernment of the world (Belluophon, 
Troades); and the wickedness of the "sacred duty of revenge" 
(Electra, Orestes, Hecuba, Medea). Euripides has been called 
the poet of the Sophistic movement. On the whole, the Sophists 
were agnostic, but Euripides followed their scepticism more 
out of an attempt to make sense of religion than to destroy 
it. As Aristotle noted, Euripides was first a poet, second 
a philosopher. He treated the great themes of life, but never 
lnsophocles, '' Enc\clo)edia of Religion ~ Ethics, edited 
by James Hastings, XI( 921 , 693-4. 
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attempted to systematize them. It is through the emotional 
power of his drama that much of the religious spirit of his 
time was communicated to the Pre-Socratics.l 
It was through the efforts of these three great drama-
tists that the religion of Homer was transformed in to t hat 
of the Pre-Socratics. True, the capricious gods of Homer's 
songs were toppled from their former position. But now the 
gods were of the nature of virtue and human conscience, and 
their homes were in the universe rather than in the city-$tate.2 
The gods now lacked the characteristics of wicked and weak 
humankind. They now participated in Perfection and enjoyed 
only the highest kind of existence.3 It is clear that the 
Greek tragedians were striving to attribute to their object 
of care some of the qualities they found so honorable in 
themselves. Excellence, piety, justice, honor, and perfec-
tion were thus imparted to the gods. 
iii. Pre-Socratics 
The Pre-Socratic philosophers were not oblivious of the 
religion of Home r and the tragedians, but their concern was 
primarily in the understanding of the physical world. The 
1 11 Euripides," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. 
by James Hastings, V(l919), 588-90• 
2so~sen, op. cit., P• 40. 
3The Greek concept of Areta must be taken for Perfec-
tion at this stage of Greek philosophy. 
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same myths were still being used, but the old gods (Zeus, 
Hera, Ares, and the other Olympians) were introduced to a 
new role. The individual souls lost their wings, and were 
now taking part in the rotation o~ the ~ir.mament. l 
Generalizations will be made concerning most o~ the Pre-
Socratics, and speci~ied re~erence will be made only to those 
thinkers who directly in~luenced Plato• s theology.2 The 
search ~or a coherent cosmology led many o~ the early Elea-
tics and Atomists to postulate both an anthropomorphic deity 
and a pantheistic theology. As early as 600 B. c. Thales 
spoke o~ gods existing in everything. There appears to be 
life in Heraclitus• Flux: God is in the world, being 11 day, 
night, winter, summer, war, peace . 113 Moreover, some o~ the 
early Pre-Socratics conceived the Cosmos as being of the 
nature of a living organism. 
In early Greek thought Zenophanes stands out more than 
anyone else. This Eleatic decried the anthropomorphism and 
polytheism in contemporary religion. 
The Ethiopians make their Gods black and snub-nosed; 
the Thrasians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair . 
"One God, the greatest among gods and men, neither in 
~orm unto mortals nor in thought." Yej;, "He sees all 
let. Plato 's Timaeus. 
2No attempt will be made to evaluate the philosophy of 
all the Pre-Socratics. Only those who have a direct bearing 
on early Greek religion will be reviewed. 
3solmsen, op. cit., P• 92. 
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over, thinks all over, and hears all over." Still, 
"without evil he swayeth all things by the thou~ht or 
his mind, 11 abiding in t~ same place, unmoving. 
Zenophanes, orten called the "trampler of Homer," conceived 
of the unity o£ everything, that is the All-One. The All-One 
was his Deity, completely divested of all human qualities. 
His God was immanent in the world, and thus Zenophanes must 
be termed a Pantheist.2 It was thus his great achievement 
that he purified the idea of deity from the last vestiges 
of human defects and thus cleared the way for a deeper and 
more mature conception of God. "This philosophy of religion, 
which is based on the unity of the world and the insepara-
bility of God and Nature, remains the chier merit of Zenoph-
anes.113 
Like Zenophanes, Heraclitus started from the observations 
of nature and postulated the existence of deity from these 
conclusions. He round the essence of the world in a spiritual 
principle--the Logos. Heraclitus regarded this world-reason 
as bound up with the derinite material substrate, fire. While 
Zenophanes' Deity was unchanging, it was the law of unceasing 
change that governed Heraclitus• dei~. Things appear to be 
many, but they are One if one peers beneath the surface via 
the Logo~ . The One (fire) is in constant change, in perpetual 
flux, t hough there is unity and harmony in the strife of 
l Bertocci, op. cit., p. 11. 2ze11er, op. cit., p. 59. 
3Ibid., p. 60. 
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opposites. This harmony is ordered by the principle of the 
Logos discernible only by Reason . Opposites pass into each 
other, being transformed by the eternal, uncreated fire .l 
The soul of man is a part of the divine fire, the purer this 
fire i s the more perfect the soul. Since the soul-fire is 
likewise subject to change, it must obtain enduring life 
from the light and air outside the body. When the soul l eaves 
the body, it returned from whence it came, to the world-fire. 
Heraclitus ' contribution to Plato's thinking lies in his 
panthe istic doctrine in which he states that God is an 
immanent spirit who creates nature, history, religion, law, 
and morality out of himself. The three fundamental ideas 
of this pantheism are unity, eternal change, and the invio~­
ability of the laws of the world-order.2 
For Empedocles reality consisted of four elements: earth, 
air, fire, and water. None is reducible to the other or com-
bined with them to form new substances. Empedocles conceived 
of two moving forces which brought about the mixture and 
separation of the elements. These he called Love and Hate. 
Love brings all elements together into a sphere and Hate 
causes separation. Change means rearrangement of elements, 
for there is no empty space. Thus, for Empedocles there are 
lBertocci, op. cit., p. 10. 
2zeller, op. cit., PP • 63- 64 . 
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six first principles. ~pedocles beli eved, like Zenophanes, 
that the divini t y was to be exalted above all human form 
and idea . God is a hol y spirit wh ich pervades the world 
with its thought and whose law governs every t hing . Wisdom, 
which is the highes t attribute of God, is a lso the highes t 
call ing of man. " Ha ppy is he who has gained the wealth of 
the divine opinion of the gods . nl 
Anaxagoras, himself influenced by Parmen ides and Anaxi-
menes, rejected the mythical forces of Love and Hate which 
Empedocles used to explain motion. He t hought that change 
could be only understood if there were a portion of every-
thing in everything. The aspect which differentiates one 
thing from another represents a predominance of one type of 
tt seed" in tba t particular mixture. Anaxagoras said there 
must be a single intellectual motive force of ~ or Nous2 
which is corporeal and t he only unmixed element, impeded 
by nothing else.3 Nous is absolutely simple; matter is 
composed of the 11 seeds. 11 The ~is a controlling force, 
pervading the whole cosmos, and active as soul and reason 
1~., p. 76 . 
2commentators differ as t o t he exact attributes of 
Anaxagoras' ~· Most authorities a gree that he intended 
mind to be a truly incorporeal entity--a rational, thinking , 
almighty being . I n practice, however, ~ remained a cor-
poreal force, a deux ex machina which accounted for the f or-
mation of the worrd7 -see Burnet, op. cit., PP • 309ff; Zeller, 
op. cit., P• 76 . 
3Kirk and Raven, op. cit., p. 80 . 
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in human bodies. Anaxagoras• chief service to philosophy 
was his belief that process is possible without change being 
possible. Nous is that which mixes the "seeds" to render the 
the emergence of one thing from another. 
On the whole, it can be said that the Pre-Socratics 
had developed a rational religion based on the princi ple of 
Mind out of the chaos that followed the breakdown of the 
Homeric and civic faiths . Plato was to take the rational 
element of the Pre-Socratic religion and combine it with an 
irrational element which sprang from human life. "This ir-
rational part of man's life found its most articulate formu-
lation in the mystery-religion.s. 
iv. The Mystery Religions 
No study of t he early movements in Greek religion would 
be complete unless something were said concerning the mystery-
religions. Wnen the Tragedians and Pre - Socr atic philosophers 
had torn down the gods and religious practices of Homer , some-
thing less sophisticated had to fill this void in the hearts 
of the Greek citizens. As neither the tragedians nor the 
philosophers satisfied the needs of the common people, move-
ments arose which stressed human imperfection and suffering, 
and offered release from this life in immortality and explainea 
evil in this life through pre-existence and transmigration. 
To this movement is given the name of mystery religions. 
28 
The more well- known sects were the Orphic Cul t , the 
Eleusihian Mysteries, the Pythagoreans, and the Empedoclean 
Speculations. Plato ' s phil osophy of religion was probably 
more influenced by these cults and orders than by any other 
early movement . All of the mystery religions stressed an 
otherworl dly existence and the importance of the soul . Con-
sequently, Pl ato borrowed much from these ideas in his phi-
losophy of the soul . 1 The dis t inc tion between body and soul 
was a basic dogma. of the Greek mysteries. Specul ations about 
man ' s fate after life, about t r ansmi gration, sal vation and 
redemption centered upon this concept of the soul . Enough 
evidence seems to be availabl e to demonstrate that in at least 
s ome of the mysteries the soul was considered man 's immortal 
part, more precious than the body, and in some wa y much closer 
to the nature of the gods themse l ves . 2 
The Orphic Cult with its emphasis on the immortal soul 
and eschatological themes and myths appea.rs to have exerted 
a tremendous infl uence on Plato . "The Orphic societies main-
tained that the soul was divine in origin, incarnated as a 
So~e •ancient woe,' and that it would return punishment for .... 
ifi ati On n3 This well-known to god after a period of pur c • 
lrntra, Chapter v. 2solmsen, op . cit ., P • 90 . 
3Robert scoon, Greek Philosophy before Plato (Princeton: 
Princeton Universi ty Press , 1928 ) , P • l 81 . 
/ 
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practice of purifying the soul was an ancient Eastern mystic 
doctrine , and was brought to Greece by the Orphic priests. 
The means of purification was a celebration in which the soul 
lost contact with the body under some strong external influence. 
This form of purification led to many of the infamous orgiastic 
debaucheries, but at their best these celebrations pointed up 
the separation between soul and body and the higher nature of 
the soul as it is vested in mind . 
The Eleusinian Mysteries were not dissimilar to the Orphic 
Cult. The religious body of the Mysteries was a secret orga-
niz~tion which promised immortality to t hose initiates who 
observed certain fasts and purification rituals. This concept 
of immortality involved little moral v&ue and was motivated 
only by a desire to be with the departed . 
The Pythagorean Order was directly influenced by Orphic 
mysticism. Its main contribution was its view of the purifi-
cation and transmigration of the soul. Pythagoras was much 
impressed with the notion of purification in the older mysteries , 
and this he took as one of the central features of his Deaching. 
For t he Pythagoreans the aim of life was to be freed from the 
circle of births and to enter into t he last, divine state of 
bliss. The road to this was of salvation lay through a strict 
systematic training in ascetic observances, dail y self-exami-
nation, and severe mental discipline. The methods of purifi-
cation of the Pythagoreans took the form of physical culture, 
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an attitude that recognized the need to rree one's soul from 
the sensual bonds of the evil body. The i dea of purification 
was later modified when it came to signify not a purirication 
of the soul from bodily influences but a purification of the 
soul by Science and Music. The doctrine of transmigration was 
based on the Pythagorean i dea of brotherhood. All living and 
organic beings were regarded as interrelated, since they were 
the embodiments of the soul-daemons. Something similar to the 
~Vheel of Karma was employed by this order insofar as the form 
that each soul embodied depended upon the sort of life it had 
led previously. The h ighest grade of life was that of poet, 
physician, or prince. After such a life, the soul returned 
to the life of bliss it once possessed. One final contribution 
of the Pythagoreans which greatly influenced Plato was their 
philosophy of number. The nature of t hings is number. The 
theory of planetary movement and the harmony of spheres plus 
the harmony of music , geometry, and mathematics was ascribed 
to working out of the proper numerical relations inherent in 
these sciences . Thus it is seen that the great contribution 
of the Pythagoreans to the development of Plato's thought lay 
in the dualism of their philosophical system and in their 
1 great astronomical and mathematical discoveries. 
lzeller, op. cit., pp . 47- 56; 90-92 . 
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The religion of Plato was influenced by a number of 
factors. Without the Olympian deities of Homer, Plato would 
have had neither myths nor gods as a background to posit his 
mature conception of a World- Soul, Demiurge , and demi-gods. 
Without the poets and tragedians, the spiritual and physical 
aspects of a deity would have been long in comi ng. The Pre-
Socratics deter mined Plato's cosmol og ical and teleological 
orientation and Socrates matured it. The mystery religions 
gave him a certainty that the gods are not wholly indifferent 
to human beings, and instilled in him the feeling of man ' s 
dependence on these gods . The over- all atmosphere of religious 
awe of the mystery religions became a part of Plato ' s own 
a pproach to the religious problem. 1 
Plato was most indebted to early Greek religion for his 
philosophy of the soul , the concepts of immortality, pre -
existence, and h is mind- body dualism . To see how Plato 
synthesized these thoughts and began work on h is own con-
ception of God, an examination of Plato ' s doctrine of Ideas 
will now be undertaken as an harbinger to t he phil osophy of 
the soul . 
lsolmsen , op. cit ., pp . 124, 126 . 
CHAPTER IV 
GOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS 
1. The Doctrine of Ideas 
The Doctrine of Ideas as developed by Plato was his 
reaction to a metaphysical and religious scepticism and 
solipsism that was current in the Sixth and Fifth Centuries 
B. c. The Milesian school o~ philosophy was the first to 
take up the baffling question of the nature of the physical 
world. Thales felt that the underlying substance wa s water; 
Anaximenes said air; and Anaximander posited the existence of 
an indefinite or infinite substance. Following these concep-
tions Parmenides conceived of the existence of the One, eternal 
and immovable. Heraclitus, on tm other hand, insisted on the 
reality of change and stated that within the state of flux was 
a Logos, a bal ance or propo~tion, and attached a superior 
reality to fire. Combining the thought of his predecessors, 
Empedocles postulated four ~rmanent elements-- fire, air, 
water, and earth--and two principles of. motion, attraction 
and repulsion. 
Faced with all these conflicting theories, the Sophists 
of the Fifth Century despaired of ever achieving knowledge of 
the ultimate realities of life or of absolute standards. This 
belief was aptl y sta ted in Protagoras' rel ativism. " Man is the 
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measure of all t hings, " was the by-word of these sceptics. 
The Sophists continued to preach their doctrine of the rela-
tivity of knowledge down to the time of Plato, and it was in 
opposition to this hopeless scepticism that Plato insisted 
upon objective values. To realize a realm independent of 
man, Plato had to establish the existence or an objective, 
universally valid reality, and this he found in his Forms 
or Ideas. 
i. Phaedo 
Plato's theory or Ideas de ve loped slowly out or the 
early Socratic dialogues, attained its mature expression in 
the Phaedo and Symposium, and reached its height in the 
Republic. Plato, upon mature reflection, reworked his doc-
trine, and the Parmenides is his final statement on the sub-
ject. 
Statements are found in the Euthyphro that indicate a 
latent theory of Ideas, only uncovered enough to suggest the 
more complete doctrine that was soon to follow. 
Remember then that I did not bid you teach me one or 
two out of many righteous things, but that Form itself 
which gives the quality of righteousness to things • 
For you agreed that it is through one Form that impious 
things are impious, righteous things righteous. Do you 
not remember? 
• 
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Tell me t hen, what is the nature of this Form, so that 
by looking at it and using it as a pattern I may call 
righteous any action of yours or another's that is s£, 
and say of whatever is not righteous that it is not • 
In this dialogue Plato speaks of the Forms not as tran-
scendentally existing, but as immanent in the particulars. 
He is still concerned with Socratic definiti on. Eutbyphro 
is asked what all righteous actions "look like" so Socrates 
can identify them. From asking what all righteous actions 
look like to asking what it is they look like, which supposes 
the existence of something beyond them which they resemble, 
is but a step. Plato took this step between the Euthyphro 
and the Phaedo. Thus tmis little dialogue can be interpreted 
as the harbinger of the more complete statement to come in 
the Phaedo . 
The Phaedo apprmches the doctrine of Ideas first from 
the epistemological side, by discussing the unreliability of 
the senses. Socrates and Simmias are discussing the ability 
of t h e senses to gr asp truth. Socrates concludes this dia-
lactic as follows: 
Have you ever grasped them with any other bodt ly sense? 
I refer to all such things as size, health, strength and 
in short to all other existent t h ings, what each of them 
is. Is what is most true of these ap prehended through 
the body, or is the following the case: whoever of us 
prepares himself best and most exactly to perceive each 
t hing in itself will come ne arest to knowing each t hing? 
lplato, Euthyphro, 6d. 
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without a body before it was in man's body, and must have 
had intelligence.1 In this discussion Plato offers a clear 
explanation of the difference between things and Ideas. 
Things are like the Ideas in t~at they participate in the 
eternal Ideas. 2 The phenomenal particulars are apprehended 
through sense while the Ideas are perceived through the 
rational part of the pre-existent soul. The Ideal world 
is 11 tbat which is divine, deathless, intelligible, of one 
kind, indissoluble , always in the same way identical with 
itself. 113 The proof of its axis tence follows logically from 
the doctrine of pre-existence. 
Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always 
repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and 
an absolute essence of all things; and if to this , which 
is now discovered to have existed in our former state, 
we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, 
finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn 
possession--then our souls must have had a prior existence, 
but if not , there would be no force in the argument? 
There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed 
before we were born, as that our souls existed before we 
were born; and if not t he ideas, then not the souls. 4 
The particular things which are thos e things that the body 
percei vas are "human, mortal, varied in kind, unintelligible, 
soluble, never in any way i dentical with [themael veiJ. 11 5 
After he has made the distinction between those things 
which the soul perceives in its pre-existent state, that is, 
libid., 76b . 
4Ibid., 7Sc. 
2~., lOOc. 
5Ibid., SOb. 
3~., SOb. 
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the Ideas, and the things that the mortal body apprehends, 
Plato establishes the relationship between the two. 
It seems to me that if anything is beautif'ul apart from 
beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than 
because it partakes of that beauty. 
Now I do not know and cannot understand those other wise 
reasons. And if' any one tells me why anything i s beauti-
ful, either because it has a blooming colour or shape or 
any other such thing, I leave all that out, for I ge t 
confused by all those other reasons, but simply and 
i gnorantly and perhaps f'oolishly I say to myself that 
nothing e lse makes things beautiful but the presence of 
that beauty we spoke of, or its company or however it is 
that it comes to be there. I am not dogmatic as to the 
manner of its presence but I insist that it is through 
beauty that all beautiful things are beautiful. For that 
seems to me the safest answer to make both to myself and 
to others, and if I hold on to this I do not think I shall 
stumble; it is safe for me or nay one else to answer that 
beautiful things become beautiful through beauty.l 
By insisting that beauty in a particular object must be ex-
plained in relation to the Idea of beauty, Plato is suggesting 
that we cannot gi ve a satisfactory explanation of any parti-
cular thing without connecting it with other things that belong 
to the same class. If the universal can be grasped, we will 
be able to give an intelligible account of the partd.cular 
instance of it. That is, the Ideas, which are now present by 
def'inition in a certain particular, are its properties; those 
which are not always present in a particular are accidents. 
At this stage of the theory of Ideas, Plato uses eidos and 
idea in the sense of Idea or Form. 2 The particular always 
1I!?.!£., 82a . 2Ibid., l03e. 
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participates in its Idea, otherwise it would cease to be what 
it is. 
Plato employs a kind of ontological argument to arrive 
at the existence of the Ideas in the Phaedo. 1 Such perfect 
knowledge that the philosopher seeks demands the separation 
of the soul from the body and thus life after death. But 
attainment of knowledge in this life necessitates that the 
soul already have knowledge. Thus the doctrine of recollec-
tion implies that the soul has a previous existence. Plato 
illustrates this point with the concept of equality. In the 
sensory world we never find perfect equality. But is not 
perfect equality supposed when two sticks are compared and 
found to be equal? The question asked is how can we know 
perfection or imperfection unless we already have an ideal 
of the perfect standard by which to judge it. Material objects 
fall short of perfection, so the concept of perfection must be 
prior to them. The ideal is itself prior to all particular 
exampl es of it. This higher level or ideal of equality must 
be known before we were born, so ~hat learning is tbe recollec-
tion of Ideas possessed in a prior state. If this is true, 
then our souls have existed in a prior state also. Such 
reasoning necessitates an independent realm of Eternal Forms 
or Ideas. Thus Plato arrives at the existence of the Ideas 
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by a ssuming that the conception of perfection 
must be pre-
ceded by the existence of p erfection. 
In summary or the doctrine o~ I deas ~ as presented in the 
Phaedo the following points have been developed. First, there 
are realities such as goodness, beauty, equality, and the like 
which are absolutely true but cannot be perceived by the 
bodily senses. They are grasped only through the reasoning 
t:aculty of the mind, freed as far as possible rrom the errors 
or sense. There are ideas of' everything possible--of' things, 
qualities, and relations, of the good and the beautiful as 
well as the bad and ugly. Second, Plato says that this faculty 
of the mind is chronologically prior to the body and thus is 
aware of' the enduring truths even bef'ore the birth or the body . 
He argues this f'act from the pre-existence or the soul, which 
makes knowledge or the Forms possible. The Ideas are then 
remembered through the objects of' sense. Thus the doctrine 
or Reminiscence explains how the mind apprehends the Ideas 
and how the Ideas dif'f'er f'rom the particular manif'estations of' 
them. Third, the Ideas are unique, stable, and eternal, in 
contrast to the changing, temporal nature of the particulars. 
This difference between the two is the diff'erence between 
qualities apprehended through the intellect and those concrete 
objects perceived through t he senses. The gulf created be-
tween them later was to off'er Plato much diff'iculty, and a 
mod1f'ied f'orm of this doc trine had to be developed. Finally, 
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by virtue of their characteristic th I 
, e deas alone can lead 
to a satisfactory theory of causation in which each particular 
thing is considered as a member of a specific class, the common 
qualities of which compose the abstract essence of its Idea. 
No particular thing can be considered in isolation. It has to 
be brought into a class of which the common elements can be 
understood. These common elements, considered abstractly, are 
what Plato calls the Ideas. Thus, the Ideas are the necessary 
principles without which the particulars would have no meaning 
or existence. The Forms can be variously present in the parti-
culars, but the contrary Forms cannot be participated in by 
the same particular. 
ii. Republic 
It is not until the fifth book of the Republic that Plato 
continues his theory of Ideas. In connection with the possi-
bility of converting his theoretical city into a practical 
actuality Plato is challenged to explain the role of the phi-
losopher. It is here that Socrates resorts to the t heory of 
Ideas. The philosopher is that man who has perfect knowledge 
of the best in himself and the best worth living for. Plato's 
conception of the dictum that knowledge is virtue includes 
not only knowledge of the good man, but also of Good itself, 
the final cause of all that is good in the universe and of 
its own existence. Few men reach this goal, but those who do 
are expected to rule--they are Plato's philosopher-kings. 
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It matters little that this ideal state is not realizable 
on earth. The ideal state or man is the true state or man. 
The realm of ideals is the real world, unchanging and eternal, 
which can be known by thought. 1 Thus if an Ideal world exists, 
it can be apprehended only by one who, by means of knowle dge 
and wisdom, perceives the Good itself. These philosophers 
desire knowledge of the whole truth and reality, hence of 
the world of essential Forms, in contrast with the world of 
appearances . 2 It is ordinary men who grasp at particular 
sights and sounds and call this reality . Of the real nature 
of things, they have no conception. These people conruse 
the particular beautiful things, which are so only insofar 
as they participate in beauty, with beau~ itself. But it 
is the phil osopher who has knowledge of reality, of the Forms . 
Ordinary men have · onl y beliefs about the physical world; the 
philosopher has knowledge of t h e Ideal world. Thus it is 
the philosopher who must rule the state because he alone has 
the pattern of the good in his soul which he tries to realize 
in t he lives of men. He must have the h i ghest kind of knowl-
edge, which is the knowledge of the Good . 
But what is the Good? Socrates answers t h is question 
by drawing a parallel between the sun and the Idea of the Good . 
lplato, Republic, 47le . 2Ibid ., 473a . 
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It is the sun which I call the orfspring of the good, 
made by the good in its own likeness to bear the same 
relation to sight and the objects seen in the physical 
world as the good itselr, in the intelligible world, 
bears to mind and to what is known. 
You know that our eyes become dim and almost blind 
we turn them upon objects of which the colours are 
longer decked with the sunlight but with the gleam 
nignt, as if sight were no longer present in us. 
when 
no 
of 
But when the sun shines we see distinctly and sight seems 
to inhabit those same eyes. 
Understand then the same to take place in the m.ind. When-
ever the mind is directed to something illumined by truth 
and reality it knows this and understands it and thus 
appears girted with intelligence. But when directed to 
what is mixed with darkness, what is subject to birth and 
destruction, the mind is d~ed, has only beliefs which 
change this way and that, and seems to have no intelligence. 
Then that which adds truth to the object o£ knowledge and 
gives the knowing subject the power to know, consider this 
to be the Idea of good . As it is the cause of knowledge 
and of truth, so think of it also as being apprehended 
by knowledge. And although both knowledge and truth are 
beautiful, this other you will rightly consider more beauti-
ful than they. As yonder light and sight are rightly called 
sun-like but should not be thought to be the sun, so here 
it is right to call both knowledge and truth good-like, 
but to identiry either with the good ii wrong, for goodness 
must be honoured even more than these. 
In the physical world it is the sun from which we derive light, 
sight, and the eye that sees; in the intelligible world we have 
the Good from which we derive truth, knowledge and the mind 
that knows. Just as the sun is the cause of sight and axis-
tence on the physical plane, the Good is the cause of every-
thing's being and being known in the world of Ideas. 
Plato continues in the Republic to make his meaning 
lPlato, Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1954), 508b. 
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clear as to the relation of the Ideas to the particulars 
and the higher nature o£ the Idea of the Good. This is 
known as Plato's Divided Line Theory. 
Objects 
The Good 
Forms (Ideas ) 
Mathematical 
Objects 
Visible Things 
Images 
D 
c 
B 
A 
States 2£ Cognition 
Knowledge 
Thinking 
Belief 
Imagining 
The line is first divided into two parts, the upper part 
representing the intelligible world, and the lower the 
visible world. Within each division is an additional divi-
sion symbolizing fUrther degrees of comparative reality and 
existence. The objects of cognition begin with the lowest 
form of perception, that of images pictured in the mind. These 
images of the actual world give way to visible things which 
are known through a belief concerning the substantial nature 
of the world. In the moral realm it would include "correct 
beliefs without knowledge." Crossing the line man is .first 
made aware of the realities o.f mathematical objects and then 
the various Forms through thinking, a state of knowledge 
that implies a degree of understanding which falls just Short 
of perfect knowledge. Finally, the Good can be apprehended 
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in all its glory . This perfect Form is only apprehended 
through the Dialectic. The Dialectic is an intellectual 
process by which the mind grasps the supreme Form through 
an inductive examination of the lower Forms . Having viewed 
the Good, the mind can then descend by deduction and co~ir.m 
the whole structure of moral and mathematical knowledge.l 
The final illustration of the epistemic quality of the 
doctrine of Ideas is found in the allegory of the cave. The 
parable shows the ascent of man's mind from the unenlightened 
state of imagining, which is represented by the prisoner 
watching the shadows of reality as reflected on a screen, to 
the actual knowledge of the Good which is apprehended by 
coming out of the cave and seeing t he sun in its full, un-
reflected radiance . 
The Ideas form a world exists of itself. They are 
eternal and unchanging, and an only be completely comprehended 
by thought. In this pure an independent state they have their 
abode, where the soul in its pre- existence perceived them. All 
learning and knowledge consi,ts in the recollection by the 
soul of the Ideas when it perceives the things of sense. The 
earthly and sensually percep ible t h ings are mere shadowy 
images of the bright world o Ideas, which can be apprehended 
only by the philosopher . Th s resume of the doctrine of Ideas 
in the Republic finds ita clJarest and most emphatic expression 
in the above simile of the c l ve in book seven.2 
1~., 509-510. 2 eller, op. cit. , p. 148. 
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iii. Parmenides 
A thorough criticism of r is theory of Ideas appears in 
Plato's later dialogue , Par.mebides. Here Plato lists five 
objections to his theory and these objections constitute an 
attack on the doctrine as st ng as any later critic was to 
inflict. First, are there F 
water, hair, mud, and seali 
for such things as fire, 
wax? Can the whoJe Form be 
present in different objects of sense and still remain one? 
and the original difficulty s transferred from the phenomenal 
world to the intelligible wo Third, if one Idea is postu-
lated to account f'or the fac that a big thing is big because 
it participates in bigness, explain the bigness of 
the Idea? Must there not be a "third man" to account even 
f'or the predicate of the Fo If the Ideas are conceived 
as patterns which things amble" and 11 imitate11 or to which 
they are 11 assimila ted, 11 why not a copy of the copy ad 
infinitum? If the copy and e original are alike, they have 
another Form for the origina and t h e copy to partake of in 
regard to their likeness, as there was to posit the original 
Form of which all the copies partake.1 Fourthly, the Ideas 
exist in nature as patterns r models and things must parti-
cipate in them merely by bei g made like them. Again, the 
lBertocci, op. cit . , p. 63. 
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"third man 11 criticism is rele ant. Finally, if the Ideas 
are not of our world, then thj y must be to tally separated 
from us and t here can be no c r nnection between the two . 
How can the objects then be oi jects of knowledge?l 
There would seem to be a need for an Idea of everything 
in the sense world, but if th s were taken literally, it 
would become absurd. Are the e eternal Ideas for such things 
as hair, clay, mud, and seali wax? Socrates readily admits 
mathematical Ideas and moral deas, but confesses uncertain ty 
as to Ideas of man, fire and t ater, though there is no dif fi-
culty in regarding them as such . However, when he is confronted 
. I 
with a1ch undignified things as hair and mud, Socrates is 
repelled and doubts there are forms of such things. But when 
the Ideas become too objectiv to human knowledge, an un-
bridged gap arises between ~ Ideas and the apprehending 
mind. Hence the Parmenides j~aves Plato with certain dis-
turbing questions. Exactly hat is the content and extent 
of the realm of eternal Idea ? If the Ideas are neither 
objective nor subjective, ju t what is their status? How-
ever, one thing still remains clear, if the doc trine of Ideas 
be rejected, then k nowledge 1s impossible. It is not until 
the Timaeus that Pl ato offerl a theory of Ideas that harmonizes 
with the criticisms mentione l above and with his later modified 
lPlato, Pa rmenides, 126 -136c . 
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philosophy. The doctrine of deas will be mentioned again in 
connection with the cosmology of the Timaeus. 
It must be remembered th t the theory of Ideas was 
reality of the sensible worl • Plato did provide for the 
existence of an universal rea and kept the status of the 
sensible world. But the pro he encountered required a 
revision of the basic concep how the supra-sensual is 
manifested in the sensual. 
2. God and the Good 
Having discussed the trine of Ideas as it developed 
through Plato's works, it is 
Idea of the Good with the no 
time to relate the supreme 
of God. This discussion is 
taken mainly from the Republ~c as it is in this dialogue that 
most of the ethical significlnce of the Ideas is presented . 
The thought of the Laws will be introduced in conclusion as 
a statement of Plato's final view of the relation of the Good 
and his conception of God. 
i. The Metaphysical Aspects of the Good in the Republic 
The language of the Rep blic leads one 
wh~ther Plato does indeed id~ntify the Good 
Good is the cause of everythitng's being and 
to ask the question 
with God. The 
being known. It 
is the supreme value and the source of all other existence. 
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It is, as it were, 11 beyond God, on the other hand, 
is a form, but a soul, tj'e supremely 1 "The not good soul. 
deity is morally immutable per.fectly b t not immutability, 
true and good, but not truth itself or goodness itself. 
Almost, in one place (Rep. 509b), Plato absorbs God into 
the Idea of Goodness, but no quite. tt2 It is precisely be-
cause God is not a Form that He can play such a role as Plato 
assigns him in the Timaeus. God is an intermediary being who, 
inspired by the eternal constructs and regulates as .far 
as possible the details of t le visible world under t h e guidance 
of that inspiration. The Gor of the Republic is comparable 
to the Christian metaphysica God, but not to Plato's con-
caption of God as 'it developed in t h e Timaeus and 
Laws. The metaphysical Good set the standard .for moral and 
aesthetic aspiration and ac God, on the other hand, 
is going to have his eye on this Good as he creates the uni-
verse. Therefore the God of the Republic is that religious 
spirit which partakes of the~ of the Good, 3 and will in 
his creation convert it into concrete essentia in the Timaeus. 
Taylor temporally resolves tfue dilemma of confusing God with 
lGod as Soul will be trl ated in Chapter v. 
2More, op. cit., P• 31~ 
3Taylor, op . cit., p . 2~9, feels that the germ of the 
Republic suggests thit God d the Good are not as yet distinct 
entities. At this stage of lato's thinking, God and the Good 
correspond to the Christian etaphysical God, and nothing else . 
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the Good by saying that it was "really an unsolved cont'lict 
between the Platonic. metaphysics and the Platonic religion.nl 
If one views the i deas o the Republic from t he vantage 
point of the Laws, it is poss ble to think of God as the 
efficient cause and the Good l s the formal cause . The formal 
cause needs the efficient cau e in order to be realized. This 
would eliminate much of the c ,nfusion surrounding the Good 
and God in the Republic, but t the expense of interpreting 
Plato in Aristotelian terms. 
At this point of Plato's treatment of God, it can only 
be said that Plato was more concerned with his metaphysical 
Ideas than with any relligious exposition. The philosophers 
of his state will strive to know the idea of the Good which 
is the source of every partie lar good . God is merely a 
developing concept that enters Plato ' s metaphysical thought 
more fully as he departs from his ethical considerations and 
begins serious thought concerr ing his cosmology. 
ii . The Religious Aspects of God in the Republic 
In book two of the Republic Plato makes the statement 
2 
that God is good and not therefore responsible for evil. 
It is interesting to note tbJ t the proposition, "God is 
good," is laid down as given . No attempt is made to prove it. 
The two terms simply belong together . In the Republic Plato 
lT 1 it 2 2 2plato , Republic, 379b . ay or, op . c ., P• • _ 
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sti ll holds to a critical ac eptance of the polytheistic 
religion of Homer. beginni ng to question the 
characteristics of At this point Plato is not 
specifically interested in the exi stence of his own 
conception of the gods ; rat is concerned with dis -
. 
provin g various contemporary notions about the gods , that is, 
the view that the gods are r sponsible for evil. Plato says 
nothing that is good can be rmful; if it can do no harm, 
it can do no evi l . responsible only for thing s 
tha't are as t hey shoul d be, for any evil. The divine , 
being good, can will only th good;· the cause of evi l in the 
world must be laid elsewhere 1 Thia is Plato's first principle 
of rel i gion. If God is divine goodness then he cannot change, 
for any change would be for the worse, and it has a l ready been 
shown that God is onl y good and not bad. Then God is perfect- -
as perfect as he can be, always remaining in his own Form. 2 
This is the second religious principle. Finally, there is no 
falsehood in the divine nature. Because God is good, because 
he is unchanging , and because he is not unaware of the past , 
there is no reason why he should lie to mortals. Thus as a 
final principle, it must be said that God does not transform 
himself by any magic or misl ead mortals by telling them lies . 3 
l pl ato, Republic, P• 378 . 2_±ill., p . 379. 
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In conclusion to this chapter, the difference of approach 
Plato takes when discussing these concepts of God and tre Good 
should be noted. The doctrine of Ideas as developed in the 
Republic is a metaphysical notion; the concept of the gods is 
a religious one. God is not the Good, but one must look to 
the Timaeus to realize the distinction between the two most· 
clearly. It will then be seen that God is good in his creation, 
and that he l ooks ever to the eternal, the changeless model. 
Thus the Ideas become in a sense objective to God . It has 
already been pointed out that the Good is the chief character-
i stic of God, and later it will be seen that God is self-
limited because he is good--not that he makes tbe Good 1 but 
that it is a condition which he cannot in his nature violate.l 
This thesis is both a logical development of Plato's con-
caption of God as well as a chronological one. Just as it is 
important to demonstrate how Plato's Ideas were born, grew, 
and matured throughout his dialogues, so it is equally impor-
tant to point out the log ical sequence of his theory of God. 
Plato said in the Phaedo that if one grant him the existence 
of the Forms , he could deduce and show why the soul is im-
mortal.2 The organization of this thesis is governed in part 
by this reasoning. Having stated Plato's theory of Ideas and 
related it to his embryonic religion, it is now time to turn 
1 L . H. R. ew1s, op. cit., P• 63 . 2plato, Phaedo, lOOb. 
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to Plato's treatment of the immortality of the soul which 
forms the basis for his further statement and conception of 
God. 
CHAPTER V 
GOD AND THE SOUL 
It has been stated in Chapter IV that Forms or Ideas 
exist which ar e realities beyond the sensual world. From 
these supra- sensual Forms Plato was able to posit an objec-
tive realm which inf'orms this wor l d of particulars . The 
concept of God does not correspond to the Ideas , but Plato 
suggests that given the worl d of Forms, he can formulate 
his psycho l ogy and thereby introduce his concept i on of G0 d. 
Chap t er V is concerned with the task of establ ishing the 
being of the soul, its immortalit,y, and its consequent re-
lation to the being and existence of God . 
1. The Being of the soul 
In early Greek thought the word psyche primarily meant 
the principle of l ife in any being . Whatever is alive must 
possess psyche. In everyday usage the word took on rather 
vague meanings unti l by Plato's time the psyche was merel y 
the harmonious arrangement of bodily parts . 1 The possibi lity 
of the soul being immortal was not raised until the time of 
socrates , and it was given definitive formulation by Pl ato . 
True, a belief in immortality did exist in early times, and 
l Grube, op . cit., P • 120. 
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that part of man that survived death was called the psyche . 
But it must be pointed out that life after death was but a 
shadowy counterpart of full-blooded life on eart h . There is 
no suggestion that the soul is spiritual or in any way man ' s 
highest or noblest part . 1 It is doubtful that the soul of 
man in early Greek religion was any different i n kind or 
quality from the body that perishes at death. 
The conception of the soul as man 's highest part was 
imported to Greece by the Eas tern mystery religions, pri-
mari l y by the Orphics . Immortality was seen as a release 
from life and a deliverance. The purification rituals of 
these mystery cults were designed to prepare the soul for 
its fina l absorption back into the being of the divine. The 
Pyt hagoreans , themselves influenced by the Orphics , conceived 
of the immortal soul as the intellectual power of man, and 
t he intellect thus became the highest part of man. Plato was 
to be tremendously influenced by t h is Pythagorean notion of 
associating the intellect with the immortal soul. Salvation 
through knowledge is clearly expressed in the Phaedo, and thi s 
conceot remains with Plato to the end. So often were the 
activities of the sou l associated with the intellect that 
mind is many times far more suitable a ~anslation of psyche 
-----------
1~., p . 121. 
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The early Socratic dialogues are concerned with estab-
lishing the need to consider the soul as that faculty which 
directs men 's lives by ruling or controlling the body and 
its passions . The clearest and simplest statement of this 
famous ministration of the soul is found in the Char.mides . 
Socrates exhorts Charmides to tend to the health of his 
soul if he wishes to cure his headache. Referring to one 
of the Thracian doctors who told him of this cure, Socrates 
says: 
He said that everything good and evil in the body and 
in the whole man originated in the soul and spread thence 
as from the head to the eyes. The soul then should be 
our first and our greatest care, if the bead and the 
rest of t he body is to be well. And, my friend, he said 
the soul must be tended by incantations1 and that these 
incantations are beautiful conversations. From such con-
versations self-control and moderation arise in men's 
souls, and once they are present it is easy fo bring 
health to the head and the rest of the body. 
This dialogue demons trates that physical health is dependent 
upon the health of the soul, and relief from Charmides' head-
ache can only come by way of treatment of his soul. In the 
Gorgias the essential inferiority of the body is mentioned, 2 
and at the end of this dialogue there appears a myth that 
suggests the immortality of the soul. This myth of the day 
of judgment is a figure of two men who have a number of casks 
to fill; one, a temperate man, has a Jar that will hold what 
is placed in it, while the other, who is intemperate , tries 
lplato, Charmides , l56b. 2Plato, Gorgias , 493e. 
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to fill a sieve.1 But here, as in all Socrates' exhortations 
to the good life, his ethics is in no way dependent upon the 
soul being immortal, and his ethical system stands even if 
such immortality be denied. Thus, the myth of the Gorgias 
is an addendum, not an argument.2 It can be deduced, then, 
that in the early period of his writing, Plato was not pri-
mari l y concerned with treating the belief in an i mmortal soul 
as a main argument; he included these arguments only as an 
added inducement to the good life professed by Socrates . 
In these early dialogues the soul is to be considered as 
distinct from the body and definitely possessing a h i gher 
position than the body. The soul also possesses the ability 
to distinguish between right and wrong, which in its appli-
cation can affect the conduct of human life. However, no 
systematic presentation of the nature of the soul appears 
in these Socratic treatises; all that is said is that there 
is a unity persis t ing through change making ethical judgments 
possible. 
2 . The Doctrine of Immortality 
i. Meno 
In the ~~ Plato suggests that knowledge is possible 
because the mind was not ignorant at birth. The mind has 
l Grube, op. cit., p . 124. 2Plato, ~~ 7lff. 
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latent ideas in it or universal truths and realities (the 
Forms) which it has known in an earlier existence. He demon-
str.ates this fact by drawing knowledge out of a slave boy 
who seemed to be ignorant of the knowledge Socrates revealed 
that he possessed. 1 Socrates argues that if there had always 
been true thoughts in the slave boy, which only had to be 
awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul 
must have always possessed this knowledge. And if the truth 
of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is 
~orta1.2 In this dialogue Plato says that knowledge is 
only possible through recollection, and recollection necessi-
tates the existence of the soul prior to its earthly e.xist~nce. 
Here, then, is Plato 's first doctrine of ~ortality, a theory 
that will be explained and given more systematic formulation 
in the Phae do. 
ii. Phaedo 
The subject under discussion in t he Phaedo is the 
immortality of the soul. In this dialogue Plato is intent 
upon a formal presentation of this doctrine. In the Phaedo 
recollection appears again, but this time not in mythical 
form. Rather, it appears in connection with the theory of 
Ideas which enables Socrates to express his belief in the 
lplato, ~, 7lff. 2..!!?.!.£., 80b . 
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kinship of the human soul with the world of thought . 
Plato sets the stage for his four proofs of the soul1s 
immortality by showing why the soul requires a previous 
existence. The ultimate concern of the philosopher is to 
free himself from the world of sense and contemplate the essence 
of things. In order to do this he must separate his soul from 
mere bodily desi res and seek perfect knowledge of the eternal 
objects . Here the soul is a unity, possessing no other charac-
teristic than reason or intellect. Pitted against it at every 
turn is the body with its sensual pleasures , passions and de-
sires. The way to withdraw from these bodily affections is to 
contemplate the Ideas whieh one must have known in a previous 
existence. If the philosopher can recollect these Ideas, then 
the soul must have existed prior to its present embodiment . 
This belief in the immortal soul Plato supports with four argu-
ments •1 
1. The first argument :for the immortality of the soul 
is based on rebirth.2 Socrates says there is a belief that 
t he soul goes from this existence to another world, and from 
there it returns to this world. This illustrates the principle 
that all things are born :from t heir opposites, that is, hot 
11 d d from bad Living souls from cold; great from sma ; an goo • 
lThese four arguments are taken from Grube 's analysis 
of the Phaedo, op. cit ., PP• 126-29. 
2plato, Phaedo 1 70c-72e. 
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come from souls that are dead and dead souls from the living. 
I£ the principle did not continue, there would be no becoming; 
life would ultimately per.ish; and there would be only a dead 
universe left. That is, if all souls changed in one direc tion 
only, they would die the death of the body and there would be 
no souls to exist in other oodies. Therefore, the soul axis-
ted before its present existence, and will continue to live 
after the death of the material body. Socrates is much in-
debted to Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans for this notion of 
opposites. It would appear that this £irst argument was not 
intended to stand by itself because Socr ates himself later 
discards the principle of universal cyclical recurrence.1 
Perhaps this initial argument serves as a forerunner to the 
argument from opposites that appears again in the Republic. 
2. The second argument is based on the doctrine of re-
collection.2 If one admits that the Forms exist and that 
- knowledge is the recollection of the Forms (see the Meno), 
then the soul must have existed before birth to have been 
able to apprehend these Forms . And, on the strength of the 
follow t hat if the soul existed before first argument , it must 
birth, it must exist after death. 
Thus far we have found that the soul of man exists prior 
1 th body Secondly, by means to the body and leads and ru es e • 
lTaylor, op. cit ., P • 18 6 . 2plato, Phaedo , 72e-77d . 
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of the doctrine of opposites Socrates states that the soul 
does not die upon the death of the body . Rather, it must 
journey from death to life as well as from life to death. 
Finally, in that the soul is capable of apprehending the 
eternal and immutable Idea~ through recollection, it must 
have existed in the eternal realm, and, as we shall presently 
observe, partake of the nature of these Forms. 
3. The third argument is based almost solely on the 
doctrine of Ideas . 1 Granted the existence of t~ Forms. 
there must be two kinds of existencej the one of simple , 
eternal, unchanging Forms ; the other of composite particulars 
which are mortal and evercbanging. The first is divine and 
the other is not . The soul is akin to the Forms because it 
rules over the body and apprehends the Ideas. As such the 
soul is similar to the divine. "The soul, then, is relatively 
the permanent and d1 vine thing in us, the body the merely 
human and mutable. We should therefore expect the body to be 
relatively ~rishable, the soul to be either wholly imperish-
2 
able or nearly so." 
4. The final argument for the immortality of the soul 
in the Phaedo follows an interchange between Cebes and Socrates 
on the perishability of the sou1 . 3 There are certain things 
1~., 78b- 84b. 2Taylor, op. cit., p . 191. 
3plato, Phaedo, l02a-107b. 
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which are themselves not Ideas, but of which participation in 
a given form is an essential character. A particular thing 
not only participates in its own Form, but also in any other 
Form that is essential to it. However, it cannot participate 
in a Form which is opposite to any property it contains. For 
example, three not only contains the Form of threeness, but 
also that of oddness. It cannot contain the Form of evenness 
or fourness . In the same way, whatever has soul has life . 
Life is thus a necessary component of soul, and consequently, 
death which is the opposite of life cannot be a property of 
soul . If life is always preeicated of the soul, then death 
can never be predicated of it . The soul is, in the literal 
sense of the word, undying. A dead soul would be a contra-
diction in terms . This final argument rests on an ambiguity 
in the word, deathless. Socrates tried to equate deathless 
with indestructible. If the word "indestructible" were used 
in place of "deathless," the proper conclusion to the argu-
ment would be not that the soul is immortal; rather, that 
soul and death are two mutually exclusive terms. When a man 
dies, his soul goes on living, or ceases to live at all. 
Socrates ' view is that the soul withdraws or retires from the 
body at death. Because Greek religion equated deathlessness, 
indestructibility and the divine, he felt no need to go further 
on this point. Socrates himself gives the last word on this 
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argument by saying that the proofs of the immortality of the 
soul really demands further examination. 1 
In the Phaedo the force of the argument rests on the 
relation of the soul to the Ideas. The Ideas are eternal, 
and hence, the soul that shares in them, recalls them and 
resembles them, must a lso be eternal. The soul here pre-
sented is essentially the mind and the intellect and is 
that wh ich stands in direct opposition to the body with its 
passions and p le asures. The teaching of the Phaedo can be 
thought of as an intellectual attempt to sever the soul from 
the untrustworthy guides of the senses, and to allow it to 
attain truth through knowledge of the essences of things. 
But this is Plato's first word on the subject, not his last. 
From this initial statement to the effect that the soul is 
primarily intellect, Plato gradually develops the soul into 
all of man that is not sheer physical matter. And in the 
Timaeus even that matter loses i t s solidity . 
iii. Republic and Phaedrus2 
A gradual transition takes place in Plato 's thought after 
the writing of. the Phaedo. Whereas in the Phaedo Plato con-
sidered the soul as being intellect, he modified this view in 
the Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus . In the Symposium the 
the 
l Taylor, op. cit., P • 206 . 
2The organization of the argument in the Relublic and 
Phaedrus is taken from Grube, op . cit., pp . 30-46. 
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concept or immortality is not only unmentioned, it is all but 
denied . Emotion, reeling, and spirit are introduced as the 
components of the soul, and the intellect is hardly referred 
to . 1 Here Plato is concerned with the nature of Eros. Diotima 
describes the nature of love as the son or Poverty and Plenty, 
as the mediator and messenger between God and man. Love seeks 
the possession of the good.2 Diotima then goes on to describe 
how one attains the realization of the Form of Beauty through 
the process of growth in the acquisition of knowledge and love 
of Beauty.3 In the Symposium, then, the concept of the Form 
of Beauty is a cognition of a perfect Beauty independent of 
our minds . This Form is apprehended by the demi- god Eros 
who bridges the gap between the noetic and the physical 
1 -4 wor ds. In the Phaedo, understanding of the Ideas came 
through an intellectual study, but in the Symposium Plato 
explains the way to the Forms by means of the psychi c activity 
of Eras which lives in the souls or men . It is in the Republic 
that Pl ato reconciles the two views of the Phaedo and the 
Symposi'Wll· 
In book four of the Republic Plato discusses his psychology 
of the soul . He had already established the three parts of t h e 
state and he concludes that because of the close connection 
lplato, SymPosium, 206c- 8c . 
3~., 210a. 
2~., 202e . 
4Ibid ., 209c. 
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between social and individual psychology there also must 
1 
exist a correspondence between the state and the human soul. 
The three parts of the soul are the reason, the appetite, 
and the feelings . It is the reason that must rule the other 
two less rational parts . 
And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom 
and forethought on behalf of the entire soul; while the 
spirited element ought to act as its subordinate and ally. 
The two will be brought into accord, as we said earlier, 
by that combination of mental and bodily training which 
will tune up one string of the instrument and relax the 
other, nourishing the reasoning part on the study of noble 
li~erature, and allaying the other's wildness by harmony 
and r hythm. When both have been thus nurtured and trained 
to know their own true functions, they must be set in 
command over the appetites, which form the greater part 
of each man 's soul and are by nature insatiably covetous . 2 
Paralleling the same concept in the state, the reason in the 
individual corresponds to the ruler class in the city, the 
feelings to the soldiers, and the appetites to the rest of the 
people.3 
The same tripartite division of the soul is found in the 
figure of a charioteer and two horses, in pursuit of beauty, 
in the Phaedrus . 4 Plato describes the image of t he three 
parts of the soul as a team of two horses and a charioteer. 
The charioteer (representing reason) strives to control the 
steeds. Two horses, one good (spirited element) and one bad 
(appetites) drag the charioteer around the heave~ resisting 
his control. 
lplato, Republic, 435. 
3 l£.!_g., 440. 
2rbid., 441 . 
4Plato, Phaedrus, 246- 253 . 
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The division of the soul into three parts is a very 
great advance over the treatment given it in the Pbaedo . 
In the Phaedo Pl ato talks only of three different t ypes of 
men; in the Republic and Phaedrus these become three parts 
of the same soul. In his analogy between the soul of man 
and the composition of the state~ Plato is hinting at the 
unity he desires in the state by showing the similarities 
between the perf'ect state of' justice and the unified soul of 
man. When Plato again turns to discuss the immortality of 
the soul in Book Ten of the Republic~ it is quite evident 
that he must modify his views of the Phaedo in light of the 
abov@ discussion of the three parts of the .soul, 
Briefly summarized, the argument in favor of the immor-
tality of the soul in the Republic is as follows: everything 
has some particular evil condition which tends to destroy it 
and if one can find something that cannot be destroyed by its 
own particular evil and be conditioned only by its essence, i t 
will be indestructible.1 The soul's particular evil is moral 
evil. Moral evil does not in fact cause death. The dissolution 
of the body is caused by the body ' s peculiar evils , but these 
cannot harm the soul. Plato concludes the argument by repeating 
1 d in the Phaedo . 2 the argument from opposites which he deve ·ope 
lThis is in distinction from that thing ' s particular 
excellence wh ich constitutes its essential nature . 
2plato~ Republic~ 608- 611. 
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The argument that evil cannot kill the soul is not 
persuasive ror a number or reasons. It implies a dec ided 
separation between body and soul which is not mentioned else-
where in the Republic . There is also a question as to whether 
all t hree parts of the soul are immortal, or if not, which 
part is. Plato recognizes these deficiencies in his argument, 
but does not attempt to resolve them at this time . He says: 
That the soul is immortal is proved by our present argu-
ment and others. But its true nature we must not examine 
in its present state, harmed as it is by communion with 
the body and other evils, but such as it is when pure ; 
in that state it should be considered by our mind and to 
find that is to f ind also a clearer examination of the 
just and the unjust and all we have spoken of.l 
Thus it can be seen that when Plato comes to consider 
his arguments ror the immortality of the soul in light or 
his more advanced psychology in the Republic , he must re-
evaluate some of his rormer concepts. Now that the s oul is 
conceived to be a multiplicity of parts and functions, the 
earlier arguments based on the simple and uniform nature of 
the soul and its kinship with the Forms no longer holds. 
Plato then offers a new argument, that of the characteristic 
evil or each t h ing, but he realizes that this does not dis-
pose of the question of what part of the soul is immortal. 
The problem is too l arge to be taken up in the concluding 
part of the Republic, so discussion is suspended until the 
Timaeus. The problem is not made any clearer in the Phaedrus. 
l~., 6llb. 
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In conjunction with the mythlcal passage of the charioteer 
and his team a f urther passage is introduced. The soul is 
t he originator of all movement, and therefore of all life. 
This principle becomes very important in the works of the 
later period. 
All soul i s immortal. For that which is ever in motion 
is immortal. That which moves something else and is 
move d by s omething else, wh en its motion ends, then also 
ends its life. 'fhat alone which moves itself, since it 
never fails, never ceases to move, but is the source and 
beginning of motion for a ll other thing s that move. For 
the beginning never came to be. And from the beginning 
all that comes to be is born , whereas itself it derives 
from none. For if the beginning was born of something 
else, it would no l onger be the beginning. 
And since it did not become, neither will it be destroyed. 
For if the first principle were destroyed it could not 
again be derived from anything else nor could anything 
else be derived from it, if indeed all t h ings are derived 
from a first principle . Thus the first beginning of 
motion is that which moves itself.l 
The imrnortality of the soul is t he first principle of motion 
as well as being the origin of all life, for without soul, 
there would be no lif e. Life and motion are equivalent terms, 
and the soul, as t he power which moves itself without external 
stimulus, is the sole origin of them both . The argument here 
expounded is reproduced again in the Laws. Unlike the argu-
ments in the Phaedo , it has no special connection with the 
Ideas. The soul is self-moved or self-determined, and , there-
fore, immortal. It does not derive its i mmortality from the 
fact that it shares in t he idea of life or in the Forms , but 
from the fact that as self-moving, it is itself t h e principle 
l Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-46e . 
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of life and of all s ubstantial rea lity. 
iv . Timaeus 
A second transition takes p lace in Plato's concept of 
t he sou l with the writing of the Souhist and Politicus . In 
t he Sophist Plato endows the world with a living soul. 1 In 
t he myth of the Sophist the world is like a living crea ture, 
possessed of a soul as well as a body . This soul is dependent 
upon the guidance of a god, and unable to carry on by itself. 
In this short myth Plato makes the transition from the soul 
existing in the being of man to the concept of soul existing 
in the cosmos . Thus far all he has said i s that t he world is 
dependent upon a force outside itself . The "soul of the uni-
verse'~ tha t is found in the Sophist endow·s the whole universe 
with life , 11and just as our bodies are nurtured by the matter 
of t he outside universe and are part of its body, the same is 
true of the rela tion between our soul and the \vor l d soul. 112 
As has been demonstra ted in the Phaedrus, the soul is t he 
cause of motion, and within it r e sides the mind. Mind is 
the efficient cause of a ll that exists in the cosmos and must 
be p rior to a ll phenomena . 3 In this dialogue Plato expands 
the notion of t he soul to include all aspect s of life, made 
poss ible b y t he tripartite division of the soul explained in 
lplato, Politicus, 269d- 273b . 2Grube, op. cit., p . 141 . 
3cf. the treatment of Anaxagora s • concept of Nous in 
Chapt er III. 
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the Republic. 
The entire theory of the soul is ful l y restated in the 
T . 1 J.maeus. The world is a living being, endowed with a soul 
and mind. The soul pervades the universe and is prior to 
matter . Soul, therefore, is once again the beginning or 
first principle of lif e. The creation of the soul is des-
cribed in three stages. First, there is being in the physical 
worl d , followed by being in the intelligible world of Forms . 
A third being, a mixed being, is made from the other two. 
The Craftsman who fashions this mixed-being then combines the 
three mixtures into a blend which is the sou1.2 The wh ol e 
narrative of creation in the Timaeus is written in mythical 
form, but it is clear enough that Plato is try ing t o establish 
some connection between the soul of man and the world soul. 
By means of the process through which the soul of man is 
formed, that is, the formation of Sameness and Otherness from 
Being, the soul can make judgments both about the objects of 
sense and the objects of thought, about the physical and the 
intelligible world. It is , therefore, the function of the 
mind to act as a bridge between the two worlds. Thus the 
soul contains within itself Being, Same and Other as they 
ld Tl~·e notion of the correspondence be-exist in both wor s . .~ 
tween tbe microcosm and the macrocosm is further developed. 
l plato , Timaeus , 30b- 35c; 65c; 77b. 
2Grube, op . cit ., P• 142. 
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The soul of the universe is a d i rrange n t wo circles, that 
of Same and that of Other . The correspondence between the 
World- Soul and the soul of man is , effected by their affinity 
to the Platonic astronomical and mathematical basis of Being . 
Not only are they both made of the same ingredients, but 
human souls are also divided into circles of Same and Other 
which have their spherical motions within the head. It is by 
an understanding of the motions and rhythm of the universe 
that man can best induce within himself the appropriate motions 
of his intelligence .l 
The above discussion is relevant only to the rational 
part of the soul, which Plato explicitly indicates to be 
the only immortal part. All of the other faculties perish 
with the body. Thus the question left unanswered in the 
Republic is now settled. The intellect alone is immortal 
and the divine part of the soul. It is this part of t he 
soul that is akin to the gods. This highest part of the 
human soul is almost more than human . 
As regards the most important part of our soul we must 
think this: that a god has given it as a spirit to each 
of us that which we say dwell s i n the top part of the 
body, 'to l i ft us from the earth to its kindred in heaven, 
for we are not of earthly but of divine nature . 2 
l ibid. , p . 143. 2plato, Timaeus, 90a . 
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v. ~ 
The Laws have nothing new to add to Plato's conception 
of the nature of the soul; rather, they serve to repeat and 
sum up a good deal of what has been said already. In the 
first book the tripartite nature of the soul is illustrated 
in still another fashion. 11 The golden thread of the intellect, 
that which is called the common law in the state," mus t be 
preserved at all costs. The soul must be honored above a ll 
other possessions; it is second only to the gods . 
In the tenth book Plato introduces a new and startling 
development . Arter establishing that the soul is prior to 
the body and the cause of all motion, the .Athenian continues: 
And after that we must surely agree that the soul is the 
cause of things good and bad, beautiful and ugly, just and 
unjust, and of all the opposites, if indeed, we are to 
make it the cause of all things. 
And as soul resides in and controls everything that has 
movement it must necessarily control the heavens also? 
Is there one soul, or are there more than one? More. 
I will answer for you . Not less than two at any rate: 
one that does good and one that does evil. 
Very well. Now soul drives all things in heaven, on the 
earth and on the sea by its own motions which are called 
will, investigation, care, deliberation, belief true and 
false •••• If it has acquired wisdom, god unto gods, it 
guides all things to right anq happiness; but if it asso-
ciates with ignorance it works the opposite in all things.l 
This appar ent dualism is a logical consequence of the view 
tha t the soul is the origin of all motion and all life, both 
lplato, Laws, 896d. 
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good and bad. But as for the possibility of two warring 
factions in the heavens, this notion is soon disposed or 
because the regularity of the heavenly bodies' motion is a 
sufficent proof that the cosmos is ruled by one or more good 
souls gifted with wisdam.1 Also the various souls responsible 
for the motions of t he sun, moon, and stars have divine wisdom 
and are rightly called gods.2 It will be seen later that the 
heavenly bodies contain divinities which are themselves good . 
The bad souls can only be the souls of ignorant men. It is 
the absence of knowledge that makes some souls misdirect 
their power. This can be cured by education and teach ing. 
Thus , it is seen that Plato remained consistent in his view 
t hat the nature of divinity is good. An evil soul in man is 
eaused by his own actions, not by the evil inherent in his 
soul. 
3. The Implications of the Immortality 
of t he soul 
From first to last Plato considers the soul of man to 
be his highest and noblest part. Though there is no runda-
mental contradiction, there is considerable development in 
Plato's conception of the soul. This development issues in 
the divine nature of the soul, so it would be best to review 
Plato's doctrine to fully appreciate the posi tion of the soul 
in the Timaeus and the Laws. 
1~., 897b- 8c. 2~., 899b . 
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i . The Divine Nature of the Soul 
In the Meno it was found that the knowledge of t he Ideas 
is inherent in the soul . The soul must have knowledge before 
its birth in the body; thus it exists prior to the body . It 
is by means of the soul that Plato is able to bridge the gap 
between the Forms and the world of particulars . The soul 
exists in the body and yet is able to apprehend the eternal 
Ideas . In the Phaedo the soul is essential l y akin to the 
Ideas ; the relationship is so close that the soul is more of 
the nature of the intellect than of the passions or other 
aspects of the body . The P~edrus introduces the notion that 
the soul is not so much linked with the Ideas as with the gods . 
fi1e soul here is also assodiated with the origin of all move-
ment . The tripartite nature of the ~oul is given expression 
in the Repub lic, and the unity of the soul which was depart-
mentalized in the Phaedo is re- established. The relationship 
of the human soul and the ,Norld- soul is introduced in the 
Timaeus , and the i mmortality of the rat ional part of the soul 
is declared . The Laws state that the soul is the originator 
of all life and akin to the gods . For Plato it is the soul 
that fuses the intellgible with the physical. Thi s the soul 
is able to do because it belong s to both the physical and the 
intellig·i b1e, being made of the two . The soul a l one can 
apprehend the universals ; it al one can initiate the harmonious 
motions in the universe and in man which gives them their 
life . The Ideas do not depend on the soul for their exis -
tence as Plato demonstrated in the Phaedo, but without the soul 
these Ideas can not be apprehended nor realized to any extent 
at all . On the other hand, without the soul the physical 
world could not even exist . 1 
It was pointed out in the discussion of the Phaedo that 
in early Greek religion an immortal soul signified its divinity . 
In general, the essential attributes of the divine is its 
immortality--exemption from old age, decay, and death. What -
ever is immortal is divine; whatever is divine, i mmortal . 2 
Plato never gives a direct proof of the divine nature of the 
soul. It appears that he assumes that if he can demonstrate 
the immortality of the soul, he has in fact p:> oved its 
divinity, so close where the two terms in Greek thought. Man ' s 
soul was that part of hiin that was of the nature of the divine- -
that part which would render intelligible to man the realm of 
the Ideas . In the macrocosm the soul gave being and unity to 
the 
to 
i s 
be 
physical universe. Later, in his phil osophy, Plato was 
state that the soul is the divinest part of man. The soul 
3 ThUS it can 
the second in honor , the first being God. 
seen that the proofs of t he immortality of the 
soul a lso 
lGrube, op . cit. , PP• 148- 9 . 
3plato, Laws, 726- 28 . 
2Taylor , op. cit., P • 306. 
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signify its divinity, but in no wise identify it with the 
Divinity . It is Plato's contention that the divine soul is 
that part of man which can communicate with the gods and even 
be akin to the nature of the gods. 1 But this point will be 
discussed further . 
ii. Immortality as Key to Plato ' s Theology 
In conclusion to Chapter V it might be well to make a 
transition from the human realm to the supernatural realm 
as it was exhibited in Plato's philosophy of the soul. The 
philosophy of the soul suggests that the soul has divine 
potentiality, set apart from the sway of passions, unchanged 
amd d all that changes--it is our truer self.2 Plato was 
fighting against the contentions of the Eleatics and the 
later Atomists that knowledge was impossible, and h is doctrine 
of Ideas was his answer to their scepticism. Plato then was 
faced with the problem of having two realms of being, the 
intelligible and the ph7sical, with no means of bringing them 
together. rlis conception of the human soul allowed for the 
eitstence of an unchanging, rational part of man ' s being which 
would mediate between these two worlds. This soul, being in 
motion, was also claimed to be immortal. In Plato's thought 
immortal meant divine, so the soul also was divine and akin 
to the divine gods. Therefore the knowledge of the intelligible 
lsolmsen, op . cit., P• 94. 2More, op . cit., P• 109. 
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world which the soul permits man to possess allows for the 
possibility of man having knowledge of the existence of the 
gods. In order to postulate the existence of the gods or 
God, Plato had first to show how man coul d apprehend these 
deities. The strongest evidence Plato gives for this appre-
hension is the soul's own consciousness of itself.1 This 
fact, coupled with the arguments for the duration of the 
soul as the ultimate source of motion, Plato would incor-
porate into the attributes of a Being who could be under-
stood as the repository of the Forms, of consciousness, 
divine, and as the cause of motion in the soul. This Being 
was to be the Demiurge of the Timaeus and the God of the 
Laws. 
It is now time to turn to an examination of Plato's 
conception of God. It bas been necessary to consider first 
the antecedent religious environment and gain some insight 
as to the prevailing theories at that time. Next it was 
important to develop the doc trine of Ideas to realize the 
basis of Plato's essentialism and the nature of his objec-
tive reality. However, Plato found that the gulf between 
the intelligible world of Ideas and the physical world was too 
great to admit of knowledge of one by the other. Therefore, 
the philosophy of the soul was developed to show how Plato 
bridged the gap between the universal realities and their 
lplato, ~~ 726. 
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particular or material manifestations. The soul was found to 
bear the properties of divinities insofar as it was immortal. 
The divine aspect of man's nature was therefore capable of 
apprehending the existence of supernatural deities by virtue 
of its immortality and divinity. This background was highly 
essential for a number of reasons. Plato was somewhat of a 
pioneer in Greek religion and consequently had to divest 
himself of the older forms of religious thought as well as 
make his way slowly to his own mature conception of God. 
His concept of God was not the direct outgrowth of the above 
doctrines; rather, it developed concomitantly with these 
other aspects of his philosophy. But in order to appreciate 
the development of his thought in its totality, not just his 
isolated theology, these prior parts of his system have been 
introduced. It must be oo ntinually kept in mind that Plato 
was attempting to integrate all parts of his thought as he 
grew in understanding. Therefore, if the whole sweep of his 
philosophy is recalled as his theology is developed, then, 
the emergence of a god is not merely an isolated fact, but a 
natural outgrowth of the man's entire thought. Also, one 
must realize that Plato never put as much emphasis on his 
theology as did later scholars, so that any attempted develop-
ment must include prior as well as accompanying concepts as 
him to bring to actuality his mature they are employed by 
conception of a God. 
CHAPTER VI 
PLAT0 1 S CONCEPTION OF GOD 
The Greek word theos is in no way identical with the 
English word God. Invariably, the Christian concept of God 
connotes a mysterious Being whose nature and existence is 
already supposed. When the word God is used, it is gener-
ally used in a qualitative sense i.e., something is being 
said about God. In Greek religion however, God is generally 
a predicative notion. There is no suggestion that he has 
any properties other than a descriptive predication for other 
subjects. Thus if God is love or beauty, there is no assump-
tion made as to God's divinity; rather, something is being 
said about the nature of love or beauty. To say that love is 
a god is to say that there is in its nature something more 
1 than human, something not subject to d~ath. Usually the 
Greeks referred to their god~as the deathless ones. Any 
power in the world which was not caused by human endeavor or 
born with humans, and which continued to live after the death 
of the mortal body, was called a god. It was asserted in 
Chapter V that the Greek words divine, deathless, and indes-
truct1ble were synonymous. The soul, being deathless and 
indestructible, was therefore divine as well. There:fore the 
noun theos and the adjective theios both refer to that which 
is more lasting than man. 
lGrub e, ..QJ2. cit. , p. 150 
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Much confusion about the nature of Plato's God can be 
alleviated if the proper distinction between -the static and 
the dynamic aspects of the divine be kept in mind. The 
Christian notion of God is a synthesis of these two aspects, 
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but Plato keeps them separated, and upon the basis of this 
separation rest two wholly distinct ideas of Plato's philos-
ophy. The divine can be looked upon as being Ultimate Reality, 
the highest form of being, the eternally absolute. It can also 
b e considered the Creator, the first cause, the active force 
of all movement and life. The first or static conception of 
the divine comprises Plato's Forms or Ideas. This is the meta-
physical part of his philosophy. Plato never calls these meta-
physical entities gods in the relig ious sense. The Ideas are 
pure essences, in no way connected with the religious divinit-
ies which partake of human personality, emotion, memory, mind, 
and purpose. The second aspect of the divine is what Plato calls 
the gods or God. These beings are the anthropomorphic deities of 
Homer and the tragedians as well as the personal beings of Plato 
in whom man can find help and guidance in living the good life. 
It is the latter feature of the divine that will be considered 
in this thesis as Plato's relig ious conception of God. The being 
of God will first be developed as it took its roots in the early 
Socratic dialog ues and as it found its more complete statement 
in the myths of the later dialogues. The concept of God as crea-
tor will then be taken up as it is formulated in the Timaeus. 
Finally Plato's synthesis of his relig ious philosophy in Book 
Ten of the Laws will be examined as his final statement on 
the relation of his God to early Greek relig ion, the Ideas, 
and the soul . 
1. The Being of God 
i. Euthyphro 
The initial dichotomy of the static and the dynamic 
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parts of the divine is given formulation in the Euthyphro. 
Socrates a sks the priest Euthyphro whether the gods love what 
is right because i~is right, or is it right because the gods 
love it.1 Plato is adamant in his belief that the gods love 
what is right~ \>Jhatever the gods may b.e, they must by their 
nature love what i s right because it is right. The gods must 
conform to the nature of Ultimate Reality as fixed by the Forms 
which exist independently of themselves. The absolute Ideas 
are above the g ods and the gods must adhere to them . In early 
Greek relig ion the gods were never claimed to have created the 
world; they were not creators, but crea ted b eings. Plato's 
early conception of the gods conformed to the eternal Form and 
scale of values. They did not create them, and they cannot 
alter them. Thus t h e gods are subject to the supreme standard 
of right, to which by their nature they conform. Plato does 
not feel obligated to establish the existence of the gods in 
this dial ogue . It is a l most as if he never doubted their being . 
Any formal proof for the existence of the gods must be indirect-
ly demonstra ted t hrough other divinities , i.e. the soul. 
1 Plato, Euthyphro , lOa. 
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ii. Republic 
The existence of the gods in the Phaedo is once again 
taken as given. ~an is placed upon earth by the gods and must 
not disobey them; the gods care for him and his poss essions, 
and the good man will join the gods after his death.1 The 
gods do not appear at the same time as the discussion of the 
Forms and they have no part in the discussion of immortality. 
Thus far in the dialogues there is no argument or analysis 
in favor of the gods; all that is undertaken is the g eneral 
statement that the gods refer to divine powers and that they 
are subject to the Ultimate Reality of the Ideas. When the 
Ideas are fully developed, Plato gives the distinct impression 
that they and the gods are never on the stage at the same time. 
Both are divine as was stated earlier; the gods represent in 
mythical and religious form the eternal world that the Forms 
2 describe in metaphysical language . 
In the Republic the gods seem to be on an equal footing 
with the Ideas. However, as was noticed in Chapter IV, the 
Idea of the Good must not be identified with God. Up until the 
tenth book the gods enter the discussion only twice, both in 
connection with art and the artist. In Book Two, Plato makes 
his case for a truthful God which was put foward in the chapter 
1 
Plato, Phaedo, 62a , 63b. 2 Grube, QP• cit ., p.l58. 
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on the relation of the Ideas and God.1 The second mention 
of the gods is in the tenth book when Plato talks about the 
painter being twice removed from reality. He says that the 
artist copies an actual bed which a carpenter has fashioned 
from a concept of bedness in his mind, and this Idea is the 
work of God. 2 In this passage, Plato makes the Forme subject 
to the will of God. But this idea i s so foreign to other 
statements about the relation of the Ideas and God that it 
must be taken as merely pointing up the vast difference 
between the Form of bed and the i mage of bed that the artist 
finally puts on canvas. The gods still represent the super-
sensual world, and when the gods come on the scene, the Ideas 
depart. 
The Myth of Er does not introduce any advancement in 
Plato's theology, as the Olympian fates Lachesis, Clotho, and 
Atropos, with the goddess Necessity are the divinitiea who 
are responsible for judging man as he passes from this earthly 
existence to his reward after death . The importance of this 
myth is the emphasis placed on man's free choice, and that the 
responsibility of his life after death lies with the individ-
ual: "The fault lies with the chooser, God is not responsible."3 
1 Supra., p.44 2 Plato, Republic, p. 597 
3Ibid., 617e. 
Indeed, the point that God is not responsible for evil, 
emphasized here and in Book Three is the main contribution 
of Plato's God. The moral qualities which ar e attributed to 
God in the Republic are goodness , wisdom , truth, and immuta-
bility. These same chara cteristics are again set forth in the 
Theaetetus. 
Evil has no place in the di'tline \tlorld , but this 
region of our mortal nature must of necessity be 
haunted by it. That is why we should make all 
haste to escape . from this world to the other. The 
way of escape lies in becoming as like God as poss-
ible; and that means becoming righteous and holy 
with the help of wisdom. But it is not a very easy 
matter to persuade men that the right motive for 
eschewing wickedness and following after goodness 
is not, as the world supposes.;. the hope of aquir-
ing a good reputation instead of a bad ••• In God 
there is no sort or k i nd of unrighteousness •• He 
is perfectly righteous; and there is nothing more 
like hi~ than a man who becomes as righteous as 
he can. 
iii . Phaedrus 
The same g eneral approach as was car ried out in the 
Republic is followed in the Symposium and Phaedrus. But 
whereas in the Republic the approach is much more intell-
ectual , the Symposium and Phaedrus have an emotional strain 
rumning through them. Eros in the Symposium is the spirit 
that bridges the g ap between the Ideas and those who appre-
hend them. In the Phaedrus Eros is no longer just a spirit, 
2 but now takes on the qualities of a God or a divine spirit. 
But the g ods appear along with the Ideas, and they only 
1Plato, Theaetetus, 176a. 2Plato, Phaedrus, 242e. 
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achieve their divinity because of their relation to the 
1 Ideas. 
In the preceding chapter, it was seen that Plato had 
suggest ed in the Phaedrus that it was the immortal soul 
that bridged the gap between the eternal realities and the 
physical world . It has also been point ed out in the intr o-
duction to the present chapter that the gods a l so are div.ine 
and capable of apprehending the Forms . The gods , which are 
per f ect and i mmortal , ar e far superior to the mortali ty and 
imperfection of human beings . They are thus able to have a 
clear and constant view of the Forms whereas the finitude of 
man prevents him from anything more than an occasional gl i mpse 
of the For ms . It i s not unti l the Laws that Plato links the 
best in man , his soul , to the gods . At this point , he merely 
points out that i t i s the gods who best form the bri dge bet ween 
man and reality . 
It is now time to reconcil e the dichotomy that was intr o-
duced i n the Euthyphr o . Thus far Pl ato has separated the 
not i on of a stat ic Reality and a dynam i c Reali ty . The met a -
physical I deas have taken precedence over the rel i g ious concept 
of God , but this divis ion and hierar chy is to disappear i n the 
concept of the creator in the Ti maeus . 
1 Ibid. , 249c . 
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2. God as Finite Creator 
Thus far in the discussion of Plato's conception of God 
there has been no mention or direct reference to the relation 
of God to the world . It was seen in the Euthyphro that the 
gods are dependent upon the I d eas: relig ious element in t he 
early dialogues is subject to the met aphysical. In the 
Republic the gods and the Ideas never appear at the same time, 
but Plato is beginning to g ive equa l significance to his gods . 
In the Phaedo, Republic , Phaedrus, and the Theatetus the 
gods are made synonymous with the di \rine and therefore akin to 
the soul. Finally, throughout Plato's discus s ion of t he gods 
it is evident that the gods are good and not r esponsible for evil. 
For a more complete statement of this developm ent Plato eonstructs 
a myth of the creation of the world, offering a conclusive picture 
of his philosophy as it rela tes to the physical world. 
i . The Creation Myth 
In the Timaeus Plato is interested in determining how the 
cosmos came into b eing . The dialogue is divided into two main 
sections. In the first section, Pla to considers creation as a 
1 divine effect and as fulfilling a divine purpose. In 
the second part he inverts his po int of view and crea tion 
is now seen as a divine product. Creation is conditioned by 
1 Plato, Timaeus, 27d-47e. 
the material out of which it is framed and under objec-
1 tive laws of symbols and geometrical forms. Each section 
is further divided; the first subdivision of each section 
deals with the activity of God, the Damiurge, while the 
section subdivision tells what is done by the lesser gods 
under the command of the Demiurge. 
In early Greek religion, creation was not considered 
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as it is now in the Christian religion. Creation is not an 
evocation of something out of nothing by a mere word of fiat. 
To Plato the thought of a creator and a thing created implied 
necessarily the presence of a substance out of which the 
object is created. Coupled with the creator and his "pattern" 
is needed a third order of existence, to which he gives a 
variety of names: space, the Receptacle, the invisible and 
2 
shapeless kind, necessity. Plato describes the Ideas or 
patterns and the phenomena or Receptacle as the objective 
terms of knowledge and opinion {Ideas) contrasted with a 
faculty of the soul that is but a sort of infrarational 
intuition (Receptacle).3 
Briefly, the creation of the cosmos takes place when 
God , or the Demiurge, with the eternal Ideas before him, 
" persuades" the chaotic, recalcitrant Receptacle into proper 
4 form. 
1 Ibid., 47 e - end. 2 More, 212· cit., p. 203 . 
3Plato, Timaeus, 48e- 52c. 4 Ibid., 27c-29. 
After forming an ordered system , the Demiurg e then places 
nous or mind in us. As mind can only exis t in a soul, the 
sensible world b ecame ''by the providence of God, a. living 
b eing with soul and mi~d. "1 Since the Demiurg e made the 
universe as a perfect replica of the model he had before 
him, there must be only one universe and this must be as 
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perfect as the model from \vhich it was f ashioned . However, 
the model is a fixed Form which t he Demiurg e had to "persuade" 
unto the recalcitrant forces of the Receptacle. The Recep-
tacle is the chaos which '' is ag itated everywhere by irregu-
lar disturbances , random vibratory movements, and exhibiting 
in various reg ions mere rude incipient traces of the definite 
s tructure we know as chara cteristic of the various forms of the 
body ." 2 Thus three principles are involved in the creation 
of the cosmos : the Demiurge , the Forms, and the Receptacle. 
It was seen in Plato ' s earlier thought that the Ideas 
and the gods were frequently taken a s being synonymous . There-
fore the relation between the Demiurg e and the Ideas in the 
Timaeus will be d i scussed to show the transition in his think-
ing . Plato is careful not to confuse God, who as a personal 
creator is good and free from envy, with the pattern of Good-
ness which guided his hand in the v1ork of creat ion. There 
is very definitely two k inds of real ity that combine to 
I Ibid., 27 c-29. 2 Ib1d., 44ff. 
impose form on the Receptacle. 
Everything that comes to be is neces sarily due 
to some cause. Nothing can come to be without 
a cause. Vfhen the mak'9r of anything has in view 
a model ~hat is unchangeable .and thus fashions 
the form and function of it, then the result 
must necessarily be well achieved. But when 
the model is something that becomes , the result 
is not beautiful.l 
The maker and the Ideas are independent of one another . The 
maker has the pattern (the Ideas) b efore him at the time of 
creation. Thus there are two realities: the one the object 
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of knowledge, the other the objects of perception and belief. 2 
The Ideas contain within themselves the meanings, the Logos, 
of all the things and creatures of the earth as a pattern 
which the Demiurge sees and understands and then tries to 
realize in the material universe . These patterns cannot live, 
move, or change, but they are eternally are-- independent of 
the phys ical world and of God. 
Following the creation of the physical cosmos, God then 
created the World-Soul and the lesser gods or souls. He then 
consigned the creation of man to these less er gods. However, 
he himself instilled the divine part or soul into man after 
3 he had b een given a corporeal body. God then proceeded to 
make the various lesser animals, the creation of which fell 
into four classes. These were the gods who lived in the sky, 
wing ed creatures who inhab ited the air, aquatic creatures, and 
land-animals.4 
1 Ibid., 28a. 2 Grube, QQ. cit., p. 163. 
3Plato, Timaeus, 69b. 4Ibid., 39e. 
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The creation of the astronomical bodies was conceived 
according to the astronomical knowledge of the time. The 
World-Soul spread throughout the whole cosmos a series of 
circles which correspond to the orbits of the sun, moon, 
and the planets . Time is conceived as 11 the moving image of 
eternity. "1--- made possible by the revolutions of the 
heavenly bodies and responsible for the existence of the 
days, nights, months, and years . The less i mportant inhab-
itants of the heavens are gods, and even the stars are 
thought of as divine creatures. 
Plato goes into an elaborate description of the creation 
of the geometrical and mathematical elements that compose the 
structure of the physical world. Following this presentation 
he delves into human anatomy , physiology·, psychology and path-
2 
ology. As this part of the Timaeus is not requisite to the 
study, it will be passed over with a mere acknowledgement. 
This brief summary of the creation lacks finality because 
there has been little mention of the Demiurge or Artificer of 
the universe. Because this Demiurge is Plato's first complete 
notion of the Deity, special attention must be given to it. 
ii. The Demiurge 
11 The father and maker ef all this universe is past finding 
out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would 
1 Ibid., 35b. 2 Ibid., 53c-56c, 69a-87b. 
1 be impos u ible~ So begi ns Plato' s apologetic for a belief 
in God . Plato is thus warning his r eaders , as he has h inted 
throughout his dialogues, that when it comes to seeki ng the 
nature and existence of super - natural beings, he must trust 
2 
to his intuition and relate this knowledge in myths. The 
myth of the Ti maeus attempts to demonstrate that the phen-
omenal worl4 cannot exis t without realities of a different 
order on \'lhich it i s d ependent. The creator in this cas e 
i s a symbol of the source and orig in of all life . It is not 
until the Laws tha t Plato attempts to g ive a dialectica l 
proof of the existence of God . But in order t o gain some 
understanding as to what Plato means by God in relation to 
h is creation, this section 'o~ ill be devoted to the attrioutes 
and chara ct erist i cs of the artific er of the universe. 
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Timaeus says that the creator made the cosmos because he 
was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything . 
God desired that a.l l t h ings should be good and nothing be bad, 
3 
so far as this goal i s attainable. Refl ecting on the nature 
of things, God d ecided t hat an intell i gent b ei ng was far sup-
erior to an unintellig ent creature, and that intellig ence 
could not be present i n anything that was devoid of soul. 
Therefore he put intellig ence in soul and s oul in the body . 
The worl d thereby b ecame a living body endowed with soul and 
4 i ntell i g ence by the providence of God . This concept of Providence 
1 Ibid., 28c. 
in Ion , and "genius'' 
3 -~·, 28e . 
2cr . Socrates ' mania in Apology,"inspiration" 
i n the Sympos ium. 
4 Ibid., 30d. 
is directed aga inst the followers of Democritus and 
Protagoras who believed that the gods were set apart 
from mankind and the world, and all immediate opera-
tiona of the world were the effects of chance or im-
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1 per sonal law. God is good-- p erfectly simple and true· 
in thought and deed; all that is good proceeds from 
him through his desire to have his nature manifested 
in the world. Upon the creation of the gods, the chil-
dren of the gods, and all his works, the Demiurge addreses 
2 them as their artificer and father. He app ears to be 
conceived of as a p ersonal agent-- endowed with moral 
perfection to the end that his creation might partici-
pate in his goodness and love. 
The Demiurge is referred to as mind and consequent-
ly as soul. There is a legitimate question as to whether 
he can really be termed a creator. The Demiurge is limi-
ted by the Receptacle and has to make use of the Forms 
which are presumeably independent of him. He is more than 
the artisjan who develops his creation out of existing 
material. The function of this artificer: is not so much 
to impart life and movement to the universe as to make it, 
in its totality, as excellent an order of Becoming as 
pos s ible. Yet it is the essence of his work to impart to 
1 More, QQ• cit., p .l58. 2Plato, T1maeus, 4lb. 
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this realm of Becoming qualities characteristic of the higher 
1 
and eternal realm. The first creature f a shioned by the Demi-
urg e is a being Plato calls the World-Soul. This soul then 
becomes h is agent in the creation of other beings . In the 
discussion on the nature of the soul in Chapter V it was 
learned that t he soul was responsible for motion and was the 
active principle of movement . Here in the Timaeus this concept 
is ca refully followed through. In order to account for the 
motion and movements of the cosmos Plato must posit a soul. Thus 
it is tha.t the Demiurge creates this World-Soul first in time 
that the material components and individual parts of the universe 
might find their existence. In the realm of value perfect 
movement is obviously the ~irst. To consider the same principl e 
responsible for the harmonious and most beautiful movements and 
for the orig in of movement, change, and life g enerally is to 
2 
render that principle divine in Plato's language. Log ically 
cons idered, that which originates motion in a world where all 
thing s a re visibly moving is antecedent to that which is moved . 
. 1 
Thus soul draws and leads all things in 
·heaven and on earth and in the sea by 
its own motions, which we call willing , 
viewing , attending, considering, opining 
rightly or wrongly, itself rejoicing or 
grieving, courag eous or fearful, hating 
or lov&ng . It will follow further that 
the revolution of the heavens, which 
displ ays such manifest beauty and reg-
Solmsen, ~· cit., p.l03. 2Ibid., p. 89 • 
ularity must be the work of a headful 
and order-loving soul. The sun,moon, 
and stars have their course not by 
chance but b y the direction of guid-
ing powers which are consciously good, 
and over all the universe presides 
t hat greaf spirit which is none other 
than God . 
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It is at once evident that this interpretation of the soul 's 
function and nature is a direct outgrowth and final statement 
of the concept of soul as presented in the Phaedo, Republic, 
and Phaedrus. 
It can also be noticed that the World-Soul has taken 
over many functions that were previously filled by the Ideas. 
The 1t'lorld-Soul no\<T imparts to the world of flux, regularity, 
harmony and reason. Now the Soul is respoBsible for the 
being or particular things. The soul is even described as 
"the cause of the good." 2 It has been mistakenly said that 
3 
the World- Soul is i dentical with the Demiurge. However , a 
careful reading indicates that the Demiurge created the 
4 World-Soul according to very specific requirements. Very 
simply, the World-Soul contained three constituents : a Being , 
which is intermediate between that which is a lways "self-same" 
and that which "b ecomes and is divisible" in bodies , a simil-
arly ''intermediate" kind of Sameness, and Otherness. The 
lMore, op. cit., p. 130. 2 Solmsen, Q£• cit., p.l72 . 
3Grube , ££. cit., holde this view, cf. p .l70. 
4Plato, Timaeus , 35b-37c. 
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mi xture of these three ingredients is divided into t wo 
circles , one called the Same and the other called the Ot her . 
These two circles are further subdi vided and made to r evolve 
in opposite directions . The circle of the Same and the Other, 
being circles in the soul , have an epistemological as well as 
as t ronomical significance. Their un i form revolutions symbol-
ize on the one hand science of the eternal and unchanging, and 
1 
on the other hand true convict i on about the temporal. Later 
Plato refers to the cup in which the Demiurge had previously 
2 . 
mingled the soul of the univer se. Ther efore God is not to be 
identified with the Worl d- Soul. Nothing in Plato ' s philosophy 
would sugg est this. The only connection between the Demiurge 
and the Worl d- Soul is that they both partake of the attr ibutes 
of the soul. The Demiurg e contains all the char a cteristics of 
the soul that have already been mentioned . He is morall y 
affected , abiding in his own char acter , going about his wor k 
wi th intelligence , and possess i ng r eason as a s oul in the form 
of pure reason-- creating , gover ning , and guiding . 3 These same 
attri butes are al so ac corded the World- Soul and the minor g ods , 
but with less d i s tinction. So whil e the World-Soul is not God, 
it does bear similar charac t eristics because it helps the 
1Taylor, QQ . cit . , pp. 445- 6. 
2Plato , Timaeus, 
3M or e , QQ • cit., 
4ld . 
p . 224 . 
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Demiurge in his acts of creation and performs many of the func-
tions the divine Demiurge t akes on . 
For the first time in the dialogues Plato makes a disftinc-
tion between the gods and God. God as the Demiurge created al l 
the lesser gods. They are cr eated cr eat ors . God is the creat or 
who is uncreated. He is timeless as he created time when he 
crea ted the world . The gods however, are temporal. God is 
eternal; the gods are everlast ing . The gods were created out 
of the mixture of the indivisible with the d i visible; they are 
impure and partake of the refractory element which is the Recep-
tacle. God on the other hand is pure and simple. 1 However, if 
God partakes of the nature of soul and yet is the creator of all 
soul, a difficult probl em arises . If God crea ted soul , how can 
he partake of its nature? To avoid absurdities the details of the 
myth of the Timaeus ought not to be taken too literally . Soul is 
an a ttribute of the Demiurg e , the World- Soul , and the l esser gods. 
The divine principle exists in all the gods, but this involves no 
problem for Plato . According to his Greek religious background , 
Plato expressed the divine principle as both a unity and a plur al-
ity. It is only later thinkers who try to impose a monotheism 
on his wr iting . The plural ity of the gods does not abolish the 
unity of God . It only renders it intelligible, since a bare One 
is nothing . The plural i ty is organized according to the principle 
1 Demos, Raphael , The Philosophy of Plato (New York : 
Charl es Scribner ' s Sons , 1939) p. 113. 
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of degrees of perfection and power, such that the totality of 
subordinate gods executes the commands of the Supreme God.1 The 
distinction between God and the g ods is occasionally forgotten, 
and in the second section of the Timaeus the term God and gods 
are employed almost ind~scrimately where, by virtue of the 
earli er distinctions, the gods ought properly to be used. P.E. 
More says that the distinction b etween God and gods is rather 
artificial and has no great significance. He says that the chief 
reason for making it is to separate the divine goodness of God 
from the irregularities which belong to the individual members 
of the system. God is not responsible for the evils that exist, 
2 
only the good. Yet these lesser g ods merely fol l ow out the 
commands of their Father, and their subordination to him is no 
more than a convenient fiction for the fact that we cannot com-
prebend the relation between a p erfect creator and an imperfect 
creation.3 
The Demiurge is a finite God . He is limited by the Ideas, 
the Receptacle, and by his own creatures. Both the Receptacle and 
the Ideal pattern are uncreated and ind ependent of the will of the 
Demiurge. Thus the power of God is limited . God is responsible 
for the 'ttorld only up to a point; he is limited by the potential-
ities of the Receptacle. Plato, recognizing the dif ficulty in 
1 Demos , QI2. cit., p. 115. 2cf. Timaeua , 42d and 
Republic , 617 e. 
3Taylor, Ql2• cit., p. 488. 
97 
positing omnipotence and omnibenevolence in the same Divinity. 
1 limits the power of God in order to preserve his goodness . God 
is the author only of the good in the \o~orld. not of the evil. 
Therefore evil is a fact even for God to contend with. 2 God does 
not constitute the totality of things . He is only one factor in 
creation and is thereby limited in his power. 
Plato has thus developed in mythical form his first concrete 
conception of God. There are many questions yet to be answered, but 
the theology of the Laws will speak to these more theological prob-
lema in systematic fashion . The Timaeus has spoken to the existence 
of a finite creator who is complemented in his creation by the 
models of perfection) i.e. the Ideas, and the Given of matter upon 
which he imposes this perfect i on to create the world . This Demiurge 
is Plato ' s God in that he is beyond time. conting ency, and divis-
ibility . In order to understand this God 1 s relation to man and the 
cooperation between God and man, it is necessar y to turn to Plato ' s 
final word on relig ion , philosophy, and theology , the Laws . 
1 Demos, QQ· cit., pp. 106, 120 . 
2Plato, Republic , 380c, Timaeus , 482 , and later Laws, 906a. 
states that God is not the cause of all things . God , being good. 
is responsible for all that is good, but there is more evil than 
good in the worl d. It is this evi l for which God is not respon-
sible, which he resists , and which he has to make the best of- --
that imposes limitation to the power of a good God. 
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3. The Nature of God 
Book Ten of the Laws introduces us to the natural theology 
of Plato . He is convinced that there are certain truths about 
God which can be strictly demonstrated, and that the denial of 
1 
these leads to bad living . In this book is found for the first 
time a dialectical demonstration of the existence of the gods, 
their providence, and their justice. Each of the denials of the 
above Plato regards as pernicious , and he refutes them in turn, 
paying special attention to the first , the existence of the gods. 
The Laws is regarded as Plato's magnus ~' a treatise written in 
his old age containing his most matured and best-settled op inions 
on many of the great themes and subjects discussed in his other 
dialogues. Therefore the theology of the Laws will be regarded 
as normative for his final views on the nature and existence of God. 
i. The Existence of God 
Book Ten opens with the statement by the Athenian that no one 
who believes in the existence of the gods ever does an impious 
deed or utters a lawless word. If he does so, he does not believe 
in the gods; or secondly, he b el i eves that they exist but have no 
care for mankind; or thirdly, that they are easy to be entPeated 
2 
and turned away by sacrifice and prayer. Cleinias then offers 
two beliefs for the existence of the gods which Plato himself g ives 
in his earlier dialogues. Firat, is the argum,nt from design. Plato 
points to the visible order of the hea vens, the stars, and the 
1Plato, Laws, 885b. 
universe as an eloquent witness to the existence of a 
1 
creator. In the Republic he also finds a spiritual 
reality by turning his attention upward to the ordered 
2 patterns in the circle of the sky. The second common 
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belief held by men is the argument from the universality 
of belief. Cleinias says that all men, Greek and barbarian 
3 
alike, believe in the existence of the gods. Both of 
these arguments are discounted by the Athenian on the 
gr ounds that one, there are contrary views to both of the 
above , and two, this type or religious belief is merely 
convention-- that which is regulated by man himself, not 
4 by what exists in nature itself. Following this preamble, 
the Athenian gives hie own proof for the existence of the 
gods, their providence and their justice. 
The first heresy that he speaks to is atheism, the 
belief that there are no gods at all. This belief he holds 
to be the least offensive of all. Atheism is treated by 
Plato as identica l with the doctrine that the world and ita 
contents, souls included, are the product of unintelligent 
5 
motions of corporeal elements. Hie main a r gument rests 
on the previously established theory that the soul is 
1 
Ibid., 886a. 2 Plato, Republic, 529c. 
3Plato, Laws, 887c, and Gorgias , 474a. 
4 Plato, Laws, 889-90. 
5 Taylor, Q£• cit., p. 490. 
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the only thing that can initiate its own movement, and that 
all motion ultimately comes from it.1 If this be granted, 
than all corporeal movements are causally dependent upon 
the "motions" of soul, and the world is therefore the work 
of a soul or souls. Further, these souls are good , and there 
is one "perfectly good soul11 at their head. 2 Plato still 
adheres to the dictum in the Republic that the gods are not 
3 
responsible for everything, but only for what is good . The 
orderly motions of the heavens show tha~ they are governed 
by a wise and rational soul, the perfectly good soul. But 
there exists another soul or souls having the contrary 
ef~ect, and these souls are responsible for the evil in the 
world. Thus, only the good soul is responsible for the 
orderly movements of the heavens. The unbeliever must either 
disprove the premise that the soul is the origin of all motion 
or else accept the conclusion that Plato draws from it, th~t 
the gods exist. 
The argument turns on an analysis of the word motion. 4 
All motion belongs to one of two classes, either communicative 
motion, "the movement which can only move other things, 11 and 
spontaneous motion, 11 the movement that can move itself ."5 
All motion is derived from spontaneous motion, and thus it is 
said to be11 alive"-- there is 11 soul 11 in it. Soul is the name 
1
see Phaedrus, 245c-46e. 
3 Plato, Republic , 379e 
5 Ibid. , 894b. 
2Plato, Laws, 897-8. 
4 Plato, Laws, 893b-94e. 
101 
Plato gives t o the moti on that moves itself. All the movements 
o:r the soul , i.e. ''tempers and wishes, and ca lcula tiona, true 
beliefs , interests and memories , " are the source and cause of 
1 
all physical movement, since no physica l movement is spontaneous. 
Thus far the argument is an elaboration of that which was g iven 
briefly in the Phaedrus for the immortality of the soul . 
God or the gods is qu i te definitely declared to be a soul 
which means for Plato that the universe is a result of divine 
purposive activity . This is what is meant by the personal ity of 
2 God . As was sugg ested in the Republic and reiterated in the 
Timaeus , God is not a Form . Plato ' s God comt emplates the Forms 
and reproduces them in the order of the sensible worla. The 
anEwer to the old question of the Phaedo, '1what is the cause of 
the presence of a form to a sensible thi ng?" is that God is the 
cause . The argument seems to dis regard the question \-lhich has been 
taken up earlier, as to whether there is one God or many. How-
ever, Plato speaks of the best soul and this would~ndicete that 
he considers one soul to b e supreme . There is not much doub t that 
this bes t soul is responsible for the one movement which, from the 
point of view of Pla to 's astronomy, presents no irregularity or 
anomaly at all. In Plato ' s astronomy soul is that which is 
responsible for the harmony, regularity, and identity \~i th them-
selves of the motions of the universe. This best soul or perfectly 
2Taylor, ~· cit., p. 492. 
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good soul is God . As to how this soul is related to that which 
it moves , Plato 1s not clear , but he does offer a number of 
different views.1 With this passage Plato has developed his 
Theism , a doctrine professing to be capable of scientific dem-
onstration . Plato is thus the creator of '1ph1losophical The1sm . 11 2 
Given this proof for the existenc e of God, the refutati on of the 
other two heresies becomes a simple matt er . 
ii. The Providence of God 
Plato next attempts to show that the power who cares for the 
uni verse disposes all things with the view of preserving its 
3 
exc ellence. Plato has alr eady po i nted out that the evil in the 
world cannot be imputed to God . If it be admitt ed that God is 
poss essed of every virtue, indol ence and i ndifference cannot be 
a part of his nature. Neither can it be that there is alack in 
his will to do g ood . It cannot be suppos ed that he will neglect 
anything, great or small. This would be to say that the "best 
soul 11 is cowardl y or 11 work- shy . 11 Next i s shown the importance of 
small things as parts of the whole , absolutely essential to its 
totality. Without small things , the great could not exist. Here-
in is the doctrine of the special Providence of God, one who is 
mindful of the smal l as well as the great . The p icture is elabor-
ated and made r elevant to the human situation . 4 The world, itself 
1 Plato , Laws,899a ., sugg ests that the soul governs the universe 
from within the heavenly bodies like the soul of man caus es all hi s 
mot i ons ; or havi ng a b ody of fire or some form of a ir, it impels 
the heavens f rom without; or th irdly, being naked of body i t self, 
the soul acts as a guide to the heavens . 
2Ibi d , p . 493. 3Plato , Laws , 903b . 
4Ibid , 903b . 
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a compound of body and soul, is everlasting; it acts as "a 
conserver of value" and our lives ar e governed according t o 
our own way of life, i.e. virtue rises and wick edness descends. 
1 Every individual soul is res ponsible for its own pro~idence. 
This is the justice of God from which no man can escape in 
life or death. 2 
iii . The Justice of God 
It follows from the above argument that God cannot be 
tempted from the path of Justice by prayer and sacrificial 
offerings. Plato contrasts the justice of God with doctors, 
farmers and cattle-herds. Having agreed that there is an eter-
nal cosmic struggle between good and bad , it was seen that the 
g ods are the allies of men and their property. Man is destroyed 
by injustice, excess and folly; and saved by Justice, moderation 
and knowledg e, all of which later dwell in the living power of 
the gods. Some of the souls of the world are of evil character 
and bestial. Coming in contact with other souls they persuade 
t h em b y flattery and by charm that they might g ive w~y to excess 
upon earth wi thout suffering for it. This error of excess is in 
the body called disease, in the cycle of the seasons it is pest-
ilence, and in cities and governments it is called injustice. 3 
If the gods were to wink at the conduct of human beings or be 
bought off with prayers and sacrifices, are they not behaving like 
the dog s who accept portions of meat from the wolves in order to 
1 Ibid., 904e. 2 Ibid., 905d. 
3 Ibid ., 905e. 
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share the plunder of a delivered flock? But can the gods be thus 
considered; have not the gods been found to be like generals, 
physicians, or husband-men who are men's most exhalted guardians? 
If so, then the gods, who are the chiefest of all the guardians, 
must guard our higher interests. Ana shall it be said that those 
who guard our noblest interests, and are the best guardians , are 
inferior in virtue to loyal dogs who would not be bribed from 
their duty, and to men even of moderate excellence who would 
1 
never betray justice for the sake of gifts which men offer them? 
The answer· is obvious that if the best part of mankind cannot be 
prop itiated, then it is absurd that the gods would ever accept 
bribes or be unjust. Clearly the gods cannot be worse than 
honest men. The Athenian concludes that the three assertions--
that the gods exist, that they take care of men,. and that they 
can never be persuaded to injustice-- are sufficiently demonstra-
ted. 
iv. Conclusion2 
In surveying Plato's conception of God as a whole, it is 
found that he held a belief in an order and a purpose in the 
universe throughout his life, but his conception of his gods 
becomes more articulate as it developed from one period of his 
life to another. The keynote was struck in the Euthyphro where 
1 Ibid., 906a-907d. 
2The organization of iv. is taken from Grube, Q£ • cit., 
pp . 176-8. 
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the absolute , unchanging reality of moral values was established. 
These values and other realities later become the Ideas, and as 
in this first dialogue, they remain prior to the gods and ulti-
mate to the end. 
The Ideas and the gods are used without distinction from 
the beginning up to and including the Republic. In these earlier 
passages the gods refer mainly to anything eternal, more than 
human and the sum-total of such things. The gods are relig ious 
realities while the Ideas are metaphysical values. It can be said 
that the gods are the mythical representations of the Ideas 
insofar a s the two never appe~r together, and they both seem to 
describe in turn the whole of the supr a-sensuous world. 
It is in the Phaedrus that the static and the dynamic 
aspects of the divine are clearly differentiated, and the gods 
are now definitely restricted to the latter. The relationship 
between the two is initially established in the Phaedo where the 
intellect is held to be a function of the soul, human or divine. 
Thereby the gods become explicitly souls, and .a definite kinship 
is established between them and mortals. Then it was seen that 
the soul apprehends the s tatic Ideas. The soul is the orig inator 
of movement and life in that it is the only thing~ that can move 
itself and thereupon lead to movement in the world. 
In the Timaeus Plato discusses his first more fully developed 
concept of God . The Demiurge, himself a soul, is responsible for 
the creation of all other creatures, both divine and physical. 
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Plato is faced with the problem of how a soul can create a 
soul, and this question is never satisfactorily answered. How-
ever, he provides a more systematic presentation of the God-
concept in the Laws. Plato was more interested in giving an 
explanation of the universe than a definite theology of its 
creator, at least at this point. In the Timaeus it is seen that 
the notion of soul now has been expanded to include a World-
Soul who is responsible for that which g ives life and motion to 
the cosmos. This World-Soul is similar to the soul in man. Just 
as in man the intellectual faculty is that which guides the other 
parts of the soul as well as the body, so in the World-Soul, it 
is the self-moving and self-ordering pr inciple that gives being 
and existence to created things. With this concept Plato has 
separated the Ideas, the soul, and God. In a sense the myth of 
creation is a logical development of Plato's theory of the Ideas. 
The Ideas a.re the static, immutable patterns which the Demiurge, 
Plato's finite God, persuades onto the Receptacle. The World-
Soul, second in creation only to the Demiurge, is that soul which 
gives being to the cosmos. The Timaeus emphasized the relation-
ship between the creator and his creation. The creator represents 
soul in its perfect state (intellect and the power to move), a 
force at work in the world through a multiplicity of souls, divine 
and human . Plato also speaks of this creator as a Father and Maker 
of the universe. However ,it appears that this Father is ·hardly 
a Father in the Christian monotheistic sense. Plato definitely 
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states that God is only Father insofar as he is the cause and 
orig in of things. Nowhere does he say that he loves his child-
ren. There is no overlapping in the concepts of the cosmology 
of the Timaeus-- all that remains to complete Plato ' s notion of 
God is a more definitive conception of God and his relation to 
man . 
The argument for the existence of God in Book Ten of the 
Laws was alr eady antic i pated in the Phaedrus . It turns on the 
notion of soul being synonymous with divine and with God . Only 
the motion that moves itself is abl e to account for the motions 
of all other things . From this principle of aausal ity, taken 
tog ether with the assumption that there cannot be an infinite 
regress in the causal series, comes the conclusion that there 
must be an orig inal cause or causes of all movements th~t is 
or are self - mov ing-- a soul or souls . From the regularity of 
the cosmic motions and systematic interconnection between them, 
it fo l l ows in Plato's thought that the ul.timate "prime mover" 
is the p erfectly good soul. Plato found that both good and bad 
souls exist, but in the universe a l l the regular and orderly 
mot ions b elong to the class of good motions. Hence they must 
bel ong to good souls . If then , God can be defined as a per fect-
ly good soul , it can be pos tulat ed that s ince the great motions 
of the universe are all perfectly orderly , they must be caused 
by God. If God is good and God is a soul , it follows that every-
thing in the world is governed by a wise and benificent Providence , 
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and that God ' s dealings with men are perfect and inexorably 
1 just. 
Plato is never fully monotheistic even if he does show a 
strong tendency in that direction now and again . He was still 
a product of the Greek polytheistic culture, and saw no dispar-
ity b etween a single God and a multiplicity of gods. For Plato 
the world must have a purpose, and as long as that purpose is 
one, Plato saw no ambiguity in the conception of the purpose 
being worked out in a plural ity of divine souls. Plato's d ivin-
ity remained gods and yet God at the same time, and so he contin-
ued to use the plural as well as the singular with an indifference 
characteristic of the day . 
From beginning to end Plato assumed that the gods existed. 
He never felt any need to prove this; it was pa.rt of every Greek ' s 
thinking. The notion of God undergoes radical transformation as 
Plato departs from traditional religious beliefs and develops his 
own notion of God . The God of the Timaeus and Laws is a differ-
ent God from that of the early Socratic dialogues . Therefore 
another proof is needed- - a proof co~ensurate with the highly 
d eveloped theology of the Laws . Thus only at the end of hi s writ-
i ng does Plato feel obligated to g ive formal proof of a God he 
knew exist ed from the beginning of his reflective life. This God 
repr esents the product of Plato ' s deeply religious nature and his 
desire to express this spiritual awareness in conceptual, philosophi-
cal and systematic foem. 
1A.E . Taylor , "Theism ," Encyclopedia of Relig&on and Ethics. 
Vol. XII, edited by James Hastings (New York : Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1922), pp . 263-4. 
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There was never any antagonism between Plato 's religion 
and his philosophy . The beliefs that he dialectically estab-
lished were that there is an order and purpose in the universe, 
that divine forces are at work throughout the world, and that 
the universal purpose is inexorable.1 The other religious 
beliefs that he held and which he r elated in myths and other 
s tories, are mostly the product of an infinitely perceptive 
mind that could conceive the workings of God or the gods in 
the world and in the lives of men. As he said in the Timaeus, 
we can never know the gods and even if we did, we cannot commun-
2 icate them to man. This indicates that Plato did not want any 
of his approaches to the problem of the Deity to be in any way 
final or dogmatic. Whenever he began speaking of the divine or 
immortal realm of being, Plato wrote in myths. However, he no-
where tells us that he finds more force or truth in science 
than in the myths. In the Timaeus , he rather suggested that for 
him they are on a par. 3 Plato used the language of science and 
philosophy when discus s ing the physical realm; when he entered 
the supernatural realm, he employed the language of myths. There-
fore, Plato's conception of God is the result of two factors. 
When he discuss ed relationships among physical realities, Plato 
communicated to others through his dialogical, philosophical 
method. \tfuen he entered the supernatural realm, he resorted to 
1 Grube, Q1?.. cit. , p. 178. 2 Plato, Timaeus, 28c. 
3 Solmsen, QQ• cit., p. 146. 
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the use of myths. However, i n either method, Plato at tempted 
to explain a mor a l and orderly universe i n terms of his own 
personal experience which came to him much like the daemon 
of Socrates . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions have been arrived at in this 
thesis : 
1. Plato is much indebted to early Greek religion, and 
in much of .his early writing he professes the religion and 
theology of Homer , the tragedians, and the Pre-Socratics. 
2 . Dis satisfied with the anthro pomorphic forma of this 
religion and the solipsism of the Sophis ts , Plato sue;Bested 
a realm of being that would answer the deficiencies of both . 
3. The doctrine of Ideas wa s Plato 's metaphysical hypo-
thesis that provided for a supra-sensual world that would 
give being and existence to the physical world. (Euthyohro, 
Phaedo , Republic.) 
4 . The r ealm of Forms initially corres)onded to Pl ato ' s 
concept of divinity , - - a static, metaphysical Reality . (Phaedo, 
Reoublic.) 
5 . ·rhe not ion of a religi~us God at thls stage is hardly 
more than the traditional Greek concept of the gods . Plato 
uses the term gods and God almost indiscriminate ly; more often 
than not when he refers to the gods he is s peaking of the 
anthropomorphic deities of Homer , et al . 
6 . Plato ' s notion of the soul arose out of need for a 
per manent element in man ' s being which was of t he nature of the 
intelligible realm i . e., immutable , pre - exis t ent, and divine. 
The soul also contained t hree parts , the reason, feelings , and 
passions, which helped explain man ' s psycholog ical make-up. 
(Meno , Phaedo, Republic.) 
7. The rational faculty of man ' s undying soul is that 
which links him to the supernatural r ealm of the Ideas . 
(Republic, Phaedrus . ) 
8 . In Gree k thought the ad j ec tives divine , deathless, 
and indes tructible ar e synonymous with sou l a nd the gods . 
Plato 's notion of the soul also took on the connotation of 
divinity , and \vas used along \vi th the t e rm gods to signify 
that which is more than human . 
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9 . ?late equa t ed the concept of soul with tha t which 
gives life to body and motion to the cosmos. (Phaedo, 
Republic , Phaedrus) 
10 . In Plato's l ater dialogues the soul became that 
a spect of man ' s being which linked him with the divine and 
accounted for his rational f aculty ; in the coswos it was the 
necessary first ca use i n an orderly causa l sustem . (Phaedrus , 
Timaeus) 
11 . The c oncept of God as creator is predicated on the 
us e of soul as divine and a s synonymous with the gods. God 
as soul is the artisan of t he universe , limited by the Ideas 
and the Receptacle . (Timaeus) 
12 . The existence of the personal God of the Laws is 
demonstra ted by means of the self- motion of t he sour:--the 
a r gument from design , and the universality of belief , the 
l a tter two both traditiona l relig ious beliefs . 
13. The Providence of God and his justice are assumed 
throu6h the logical conc lusions of t he existence of God . 
( La1·TS) 
14. Plato ' s fina l concept ion of the na tur·e and being 
of God is the result of a development out of the r eligious 
t hought of early Greece combined with t he notion that the 
soul is that element i n man and t he cosmos t hat unites t hem 
,.,i th the supe rna tura l grou nd of Being. Pla to ' s own contri -
bution to the na ture of God includes him as being perfec t ly 
good (Re}ublic) ; of t he na ture of .soul (Phaedrus) ; personal 
(Timaeus ; finite crea tor (Tima eus); and divine (Phaedrus , 
Republic , Timaeus , and Laws ). 
15 . Plato has exerted a tremendous influence on Chri s tian 
theology . The concepts of God as spirit or soul , the Loeos 
doctrine, the devel:~proent of the immortal sou l , t he theory of 
creation , cosmic duali sm , and Pl atonic Idealism have all found 
their i,ray into t he develo~ment of modern real1gious t hou ght. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of the thesis is to develop the concept of 
God in Plato 's thought as it grew out of his knowledge of 
early Greek religion into his mature expression or the meaning 
of human life and the telic aspects of the cosmos. The develop-
ment of Plato's deity necessarily had to encompass his episte-
mology and metaphysics as these aspects of his philosophy com-
bined to render the concept of God a logical possibility. 
The thesis begins with an examination of early Greek 
religion, as it is necessary to understand the antecedent 
influences that were brought to bear on Plato's thought. Plato 
was tremendously indebted to the religion of Homer and other 
early Greek religious writers, and this influence was to 
pervade his early dialogues. However, the scepticism of his 
contemporaries provoked Plato to seek a realm of being that 
was more compatible with his thinking than the naturalism and 
the solipsism of the Pre-Socratics and the Sophists. The 
doctrine of Ideas is the result of this search for a divine 
realm of being. Plato makes a distinction between the statio 
aspect of the supernatural and the dynamic. The Ideas re-
present the static and metaphysical part of the divine . The 
gods are hardly mentioned along with the Ideas; they connote 
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the dynamic i n Pl ato's divinity and ao not appear when Plato 
gives expression to his metaphysical entities. The concept 
of the soul developed early, and its creation made poss ible 
the ap9r ehension of the Ideal realm by man. The tripartite 
division of the sou l introduces us to Plato ' s soul psychology. 
The sou l has the intellect as its highes t f aculty ; it i s t h is 
part of man that communicates with the supra- sensual world. 
Plato ' s later conception of the soul found i t to be the 
orig inator of all motion and life. 
The philosophy of the soul suggests that the soul has 
divine potent i a li ty a nd i s tha t concept that makes possible 
man ' s knowledge of the gods . The notion of God or the gods in 
the religious sens e i s only suggested in the early d i alogues . 
It is not until the Timaeus that Plato considers t he gods 
seriously . The Demiurge i s the creator God who i s r espons ible 
for the creation of the cosmos and a ll the living t hinss i n i t . 
He is aided by the Forms and hindered by the force of the 
Receptacle . In this way t~e Demiurge is considered a finite 
God . The distinction i s made i n the 'I'i maeus between God and 
the gods . God i s an uncrea ted soul who is the creator of the 
l esser gods . Throughout Plato ' s \'lri tine; there is never any 
clear - cut separ ation between God and the gods . This is in 
a ccord with the traditional r~ ligious beliefs . However , Plato 
does recognize one uncreated be i ng who is the cause of every 
other being . In the Laws Plato establishes the existence of 
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God by means of hi s ar gument for t he sxlstenoe of the soul 
and the cosmolog ical a rgument set fort h in t he Timaitis . I n 
Book Ten of t he Laws Pla to sums up all t he phi l osophic concepts 
tha t came togethe r to formulate h i s concept of God . He 
proves tha existence of God ; t he goodness of God ; the r eal ity 
of God ' s Providenc e; the i mmorta lity of the soul; and the 
corr espondence be tween man ' s destiny and God ' s works . The 
force of Pl at o ' s ar gument for the e xi stence of God i n t he la'\'IS 
r es t s on hi s doctrine of Ideas and t he philosophy of the soul . 
Out of Pl a to ' s life of philosophical a nd r e lig ious investi-
ga tions h~s arisen the most infl uential and im~tant phil-
osophical questions a nd theol ogi cal principle s i n Western 
thou ght . 
